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HAITIAN ASYLUM ADVOCACY:
QUESTIONS TO ASK APPLICANTS AND NOTES
ON INTERVIEWING AND REPRESENTATION
Steven Forester*
L Introduction
Thousands of Haitians fled their homeland after Jean-Bertrand
Aristide, Haiti's first democratically-elected president, was ousted in
September 1991.1 They were intercepted by United States Coast
Guard vessels,2 detained at Guantfnamo Bay, Cuba,3 and interviewed
by INS officers who determined whether they should be brought to
the United States to pursue their asylum claims.' At first the officers
"screened out" most of the Haitians, and massive repatriations from
Guantdnamo were halted only by a series of restraining orders issued
by a Florida federal district court judge.' While the restraining
Supervising Attorney at the Haitian Refugee Center, Inc., 119 NE 54th Street,
Miami, FL 33137; B.A., University of California at Berkeley, 1975; J.D., University
of California at Davis, 1978. A version of this article first appeared in The Immigration
Newsletter, vol. 20, nos. 1 & 2 (June and August 1992), published by the National
Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild. The author wishes to thank Richard
landoli, Chin Wei Fong, and Deborah Anker for their suggestions, and especially, for
invaluable expert assistance in the revision and updating of the article for publication in
this Journal, including the use of his Haitian History Dateline, infra Appendix A, and
Haitian Words and Concepts, infra Appendix B, Merrill Smith of Church World Service
in Miami. Any errors remain the author's alone.
Deborah Sharp, Haitian Refugees see Hope with a New Administration, USA
TODAY, Nov. 27, 1992, at 3A. Since September 1991, nearly 40,000 Haitians have fled
their country. Id.
2 Id.
I Id.
4 Id. The interviews were conducted to determine if the Haitians could seek asylum
in the United States as political refugees. Id.
' Jerry Seper, Future of Haitian Refugees Still Unclear, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 3,
1991, at A3. United States District Judge C. Clyde Atkins issued the temporary
restraining order, but not before 538 Haitian refugees had been returned to Haiti. Id.
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orders were in effect, the percentage of Haitians "screened in" began
to rise." The Supreme Court now has vacated all lower court
restraints,7 most of the Haitians have been repatriated, and Congress
has refused to intervene! Nevertheless, thousands of Haitians have
been "screened in" to pursue asylum claims in the United States. 9
This article will address background facts on Haiti, basic
principles about conducting Haitian asylum interviews, the
institutional setting and the need for quality control, questions to ask
Haitian asylum applicants, interview principles and techniques,
completing the asylum forms and checking for mistakes, preparing
for the INS interview, and the possibility of filing an application late.
Among the many obstacles (e.g., culture shock, failure to use
phrase-by-phrase interpretation, fear of you as an authority figure,
fear of your interpreter as a possible Haitian spy, etc.) to obtaining
the full story from your client, which is necessary for a well-
developed claim, one insurmountable obstacle is your own ignorance
of the historical and social context of Haitian political events over the
last decade, an obstacle which you must overcome by learning about
it before you ever sit down with your client. A client won't give you
a full explanation, and you won't understand and will misconstrue
and misinterpret the explanation he or she gives, unless you "know"
Haiti, and if your client senses that you "won't understand." You
must be intimately familiar with Haiti's recent political history and
with the entire world of contexts and possibilities, and you must take
the initiative in intelligently asking about and discussing them with
your client. Otherwise you won't uncover the story; indeed, you
won't have any idea what you're doing, and you will be doing your
client a tremendous disservice. Your intimate knowledge will give
' See Thomas Sceffey, Yale Students Win Rights for Refugees in Cuba, CONN. L.
TRIB., Apr. 13, 1992, at 13.
' See Deborah Sharp, Haitian Refugees see Hope with a New Administration, USA
TODAY, Nov. 27, 1992, at 3A.
'See Islands of Inequality, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 1992, at A18 ("All three branches
of the federal government share responsibility for [repatriation of Haitians].").
9 United States asylum officers on GuantAnamo "screened in" about 10,734 Haitians,
permitting them to pursue individual asylum applications in the United States, and
"screened out" about 28,000 others, who were forcibly repatriated to Haiti, where
hundreds or thousands of them have undoubtedly been persecuted. See David G.
Savage, High Court to Hear Haitian Refugee Case, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1992, at AS.
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your client confidence that you understand or at least know enough
to learn.
A. Background Facts on Haiti: The Duvaliers to Mid-1990 °
The Tonton Macoutes (Volunteers for National Security or
VSN) were created by Francois (Papa Doc) Duvalier in the 1960s and
used by his son Jean-Claude (Baby Doc) Duvalier until his ouster in
1986 as a paramilitary political force to maintain their rule and offset
the power of Haiti's mulatto dominated army, Haiti's traditional
kingmakers." In exchange, Macoutes terrorized common Haitians
with impunity, arbitrarily killing, imprisoning, or abusing personal
enemies, falsely accusing persons of being "anti-Duvalier,"
expropriating land and businesses, extorting goods and money, and
raping." Haiti has often been called a "kleptocracy," a government
by thieves.' 3
Popular pressure finally ousted Jean-Claude Duvalier on
February 7, 1986.' His hand-picked successor, General Henry
Namphy, became a dictator.' 5 The Macoutes were never disarmed;
Namphy announced but never effectuated their dissolution,
incorporating many into the military. t6 Others formed paramilitary
groups serving Duvalierists, 7 landowners,'" and their own predatory
10 For a general synopsis of the history of Haiti with a description of their
significance, see Haitian History Dateline, infra Appendix A. For a glossary of
commonly used words and concepts used in Haitian asylum cases, see Haitian Words and
Concepts, infra Appendix B.
" Clara Germani, Violence Derails Haiti Elections, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov.
30, 1987, at 1.
2 Nathaniel Sheppard Jr., Haitians Being Ruled by Promises, CHI. TRm., Oct. 9,
1988, at C5.
" David Adams, Haiti Living Down to its Corrupt History, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 14,
1992, at A10. See also discussion of Desir v. lchert, infra notes 140-43 and
accompanying text.
" Mark Kurlansky, Words No Longer Enough in City of Poets, CHI. TRIB., June 2,
1988, at C6.
" Gary Marx, Haitian Leaders Believe They Can Trust Army Vow, CHI. TRIB., Mar.
25, 1990, at 4.
16 Id.
'7 Robert Pear, U.S. Officials say New Haiti Rulers are About Like the Old Ones,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1988, at All.
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interests. 19 ,
Namphy's rule was bloody -- the streets were full of the
bodies of persons killed by soldiers and by former Macoutes, ° who
were also known as "attaches," "Zenglendo," and "the motherless
ones." 2' Haitians came to refer to the constant random violence as
"the insecurity," 22 which most observers thought Namphy fostered to
thwart democratic change.
Under international pressure, Namphy scheduled elections for
November 29, 1987.23 The Haitian Christian Democratic Party's
(PDCH) Sylvio Claude, imprisoned many times by Duvalier, was a
leading democrat. 4 Other candidates were Marc Bazin of the
Movement for the Institution of Democracy in Haiti (MIDH), Louis
Dejoie of the National Agricultural Industrial Party (PAIN), and
Gerard Gourge of the National Concentration Front (FNC).25 In the
months before the election, the military terrorized the Provisional
Electoral Commission (CEP), an independent civilian body created
by the March 1987 Constitution, and opposition figures, murdering
presidential candidates Louis Eugene Athis26 and Yves Volel, the
latter in front of police headquarters.2 On election day military and
" Michael S. Hooper & Anne Manuel, The U.S. Role in Haiti's Debacle, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 16, 1987, at A19.
"9 See Marlene Sokol, New Leaders Met With Mixed Emotions in Haiti, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 2, 1988, at IA.
1o Julia Preston, Gunmen Operated out of Haitian Mayor's House, WASH. POST,
Sept. 26, 1988, at A9.
21 Id. See also Lee Hockstader, Military Keeps Haitian Town on Tight Rein, WASH.
POST, Mar. 17, 1992, at All. The "motherless ones" ("San Manman" or literally
'!without mothers") appears to be particular to the macoutes of the St. Marc area. See
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, CURRENT CONCERNS: DEATHS AND DETENTION, TORTURE,
AND INHUMANE PRISON CONDITIONS (1987).
2' Debbie Sontag, Violence, Protest Rise Again in Haiti, MIAMI HERALD, July 15,
1990, at LA.
I Haiti Sees Constant Turmoil Since Duvalier, Reuters, Apr. 2, 1989, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
24 Louis Dejoie, To Foil Haiti's Election Charade, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1988, at
A31.
Sid.
Caribbean: U.S. Finds Limited Human Rights 'Progress in 1988, Inter Press
Service, Feb. 8, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
27Id.
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paramilitary thugs murdered voters at Port-au-Prince polling places.2"
Namphy, who ordered this violence, canceled the election, rigging a
new one (often called the "army elections") for January.29
Claude, other candidates, and most of the population
boycotted this election, and the CEP was excluded from it.3°
Namphy installed civilian Leslie Manigat but ousted him in June
when the latter, having botched the arrest of Namphy rival Colonel
Jean-Claude Paul, also .tried to get rid of Namphy.3 1 The first part
of 1988 was a period of constant insecurity, assassinations, and
corpses in the streets.32 Namphy aligned himself increasingly with
the Macoutes, who, among other atrocities, macheted to death
hundreds of peasants in Jean Rabel who sought land reform."
In September 1988 Macoutes controlled by Franck Romain,
the Duvalierist mayor of Port-au-Prince and a close Namphy
confidante,34 invaded St. Jean Bosco Church.35 This church and the
LaFanmi Selavi orphanage was the base of Father Jean-Bertrand
Aristide, the charismatic and articulate "liberation theology" priest
who since the mid-1980s was beloved by Haiti's masses for his
sermons, nationally broadcast by radio, in which he repeatedly
denounced successive dictatorships and insisted on justice and basic
" Haiti Sees Constant Turmoil Since Duvalier, Reuters, Apr. 2, 1989, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
I David Adams, Haiti: Living Down to its Corrupt History, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 14,
1992, at A10.
" Nathaniel Sheppard Jr., Army-tied Candidate Wins Haiti, CHI. TRlB., Jan. 25,
1988, at 4.
3' Haiti's Ordeal: The Years of Strife, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1988, at All.
32 Ron Howell, Haitians Protest Voting; General Strike Begins as Junta's Foes Urge
Boycott of Election Today, NEWSDAY, Jan. 17, 1988, at 3. Namphy described Haiti as
.a country sufficiently traumatized by blind violence." Id.
11 Haitian Refugees are Mistreated, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 8, 1988, at 19. See also Dan
Williams, Any Sudden Noise May Cause Panic; Anarchy Grows in Haiti as Regime is
Pressed to Quit, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1987, at 1 (several hundred peasants may have
died in a rifle and machete attack).
I Don A. Schanche, Haiti's Bishops Call for Democracy; Press Government for
Reforms, Ask for More Foreign Aid, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1988, at 6.
3S Haiti's Ordeal: The Years of Strife, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1988, at All.
_ i i
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human rights for Haiti's poor.3 6 Although Aristide escaped, the
invaders killed twelve parishioners and injured more." The outrage
received international attention and prompted Namphy's ouster a few
days later in a coup by reform-minded young army officers."
Namphy was replaced, however, by General Prosper Avril,
notorious for having advised the Duvaliers"9 and managed Jean-
Claude's bank accounts, who co-opted the coup, imprisoning and
dismissing the reformist officers, most prominently a Sargeant Patrick
Frantz Beauchard. 4' Avril continued to align himself with the
Macoutes and ruled as brutally as Namphy, as murders and insecurity
continued."' Rival drug dealer-Colonel Jean Claude Paul, head of the
Casernes Dessalines military barracks, died mysteriously in late
1988.42 In April 1989 Avril disbanded the military's elite "Leopard"
unit after its attempted coup.43 In November he ordered the arrest
and torture of three, including Port-au-Prince's mayor under Aristide
Evans Paul, showing their bloodied faces on television." In January
1990 Avril declared a state of siege and ordered the arrest, beating,
or exile of dozens of opponents, party members, and journalists.45
In March 1990 Avril was replaced by an interim civilian government
' Kenneth Freed, Loss of Support Among Latin Poor Evident During Pope's Tour,
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1992, at B4. Ironically, in a visit to the Dominican Republic,
Pope John Paul II sided with conservative bishops and called for support for the military-
backed regime that overthrew the Aristide Government. Id.
" Michael Norton, Priest's Ouster Silences Haiti's Voice of the Poor, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 1, 1989, at 30. At least 70 people were injured. Id.
8 Id.
" Kathie Klarreich, Under Avril, Haiti's Problems Persist, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Oct. 6, 1989, at 18.
o Jonathan Power, Behind Haiti's Upcoming Election, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 28, 1990,
at A19.
"' Kathie Klarreich, Under Avril, Haiti's Problems Persist, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MoNrrOR, Oct. 6, 1989, at 18.
" Haiti Sees Constant Turmoil Since Duvalier, Reuters, Apr. 2, 1989, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
'" Gary Marx, Haitian Leaders Believe They Can Trust Army Vow, CHI. TRIB., Mar.
25, 1990, at 4C.
" Adrian Walker, Tortured Haitians Here For Medical Aid, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar.
8, 1990, at 30.
' Haitian Clampdown Reminiscent of Past Terrors, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 29, 1990, at
10D.
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led by a reluctant and weak Supreme Court justice, Madame Ertha
Pascal-Trouillot." From 1986 through 1990, according to human
rights experts, the Haitian military was the most corrupt and brutal
in the hemisphere.47
Under Trouillot the insecurity continued and elections were
postponed.4 In a June attack on the State Council, the military
assassinated two democrats, including the author of a constitutional
provision barring Duvalierists from office for ten years.49  Two
weeks later Roger Lafontant, Duvalier's Interior Minister and head
of the Macoutes, returned from exile, was warmly welcomed at the
airport by military leaders,50 and despite the constitutional provision,
proclaimed his presidential candidacy as head of a newly-formed
party of Duvalierists and Macoutes.5' The newspaper Le Petit
Samedi Soir announced a "Macoute Spring" under Lafontant. The
government issued an arrest warrant for conspiracy against the state
but was unable to enforce it;52 Lafontant held a convention of
Duvalierists and Macoutes and campaigned openly throughout the
country, ignoring the warrant.53
In late 1989 the United States had installed a new ambassador,
Susan Benesch, Welcome to Haiti My Dear. I am at Your Service, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar. 1, 1992, at A10.
'4 See generally In the Army's Hands: Human Rights in Haiti on the Eve of the
Elections, (Americas Watch, New York, N.Y.), Dec. 1990, at 1); The More Things
Change ... Human Rights in Haiti, (Americas Watch, New York, N.Y.), Feb. 1989,
at 1.
' Duvalierist Candidates Barred, Facts on File World News Digest, Dec. 7, 1990,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
' See Edwige Balutansky, Haiti Faces Violence, Political Instability, Reuters, June
25, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
-o Hugh Davies, 'Goon Squad'Head Returns to Haiti, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, July
13, 1990, at 11.
"' Haiti's Feared Ex-security Chief to Seek Presidency, Reuters, Oct. 18, 1990,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
2 Hugh Davies, 'Goon Squad' Head Returns to Haiti, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, July
13, 1990, at 11.
"I Haiti's Feared Ex-security Chief to Seek Presidency, Reuters, Oct. 18, 1990,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
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Alvin Adams,'" and in August 1990 Vice-President Quayle, in a visit,
told the Haitian military to permit and protect elections, eventually set
for December 16th."5 In late October a coalition of parties entitled the
National Front for Change and Democracy (FNCD) chose Aristide
as its presidential candidate, replacing Victor Benoit.
6
Aristide's movement was called "Lavalas" (the flood),
connoting the people's power to create sweeping change.5 7 "Titid ak
nou se lavalas" (With Aristide we are a flood), "Titid" being
Aristide's diminutive, was another common slogan, frequently
appearing for example on campaign leaflets, which people distributed
and posted on their houses, clear symbols of their political beliefs.5"
Under pressure from the United States, the military provided
pre-election security,5 9 demonstrating the army's capacity for highly
organized concerted action, which it later manifested by its
nationwide and well-organized extreme repression of all suspected
Aristide sympathizers following the September 1991 coup. '  There
' Today in Congress, WASH. POST, Sept. 28, 1989, at A18. Adams' nickname was
"Bourik Chaje," derived from his airport announcement upon arrival, "Bourik chaje pa
kenpe!" ("A burdened donkey doesn't stay still!"), indicating United States support for
free and fair elections.
11 Don A. Schanche, Haiti Fears the Worst, Hopes for Best in Election, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 21, 1990, at 13.
1 Kathie Klarreich, Ex-Duvalier Official's Candidacy Casts Shadow on Haiti
Election, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 25, 1990, at A21.
" Pamela Constable, At UN, Aristide Stands up for Haiti, Pledging Creation of a
Just Society, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 26, 1991, at 28. An important slogan was "Yon sel
nou feb, ansanm nou fo, ansanm-ansanm nou se lavalas!" ("Alone we are weak, together
we are strong, all together we are a flood!").
' Steve Johnson, Er-Haitian Chief Keeps Hopes Alive, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 3, 1992,
at 1.
s' Don A. Schanche, Haiti Fears the Worst, Hopesfor Best in Election, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 21, 1990, at 13.
. 60 See LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, HAITI, A HUMAN RIGHTS
NIGHTMARE 2-3 (Sept. 1992) ("The military's positive role in the elections indicated the
level of organization, discipline and control that exists in the Haitian armed forces. This
behavior contradicts past and present claims by apologists for the military that the army
is nothing more than a loose coalition of competing gangs and that the military hierarchy
is unable to control the actions of its subordinates."). The military is also paranoid and
lashes out against any perceived opposition.
[The military's] fear can be taken to incredible extremes, to the point
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was little violence except a December 5th bombing which killed five
persons at an Aristide rally in Pdtionville.6' Hundreds of United
States, United Nations, and other observers oversaw the election,
which Aristide won handily, winning sixty-eight percent of the vote
in a field of eleven candidates, with the U.S.-favored economist Marc
Bazin coming in a distant second with twelve percent.62 Elections
were also held for deputy (representative), senator, first, second, and
third magistrat (mayor), and local administrative council ("casee")
members,63 the parties each fielding candidates."
that at one point anyone wearing a white coat was thought to be a
communist, as was anyone teaching Creole to the peasants, etc. The
military is quite arbitrary. It probably doesn't trifle with distinctions
at this point but acts on denunciations and any sign of an individual
being opposed to the coup. One should assume that with the return
of the section chiefs and the hostile military that the level of paranoia
and ignorance remains high. Probably anyone wearing a T-shirt
which deals with any political theme . . . anyone listening to any
news broadcast about events in Haiti, etc., can be assumed to be a
political opponent. Clearly anyone meeting with anyone known to
be an "activist," anyone closely associated with a project to improve
the life of the people which is not run by the military, etc., is-
presumed to be active in the peasant organizations. Even religious
meetings are suspect.
Memorandum from Mike Levy, Amnesty International Country Group Coordinator for
Haiti to John D. Evans, INS Resource Information Director 5 (Jan. 5, 1992) (on file
with the New York Law School Journal of Human Rights; also available from the
Documentation Exchange, PO Box 2327, Austin, Tex. 78768 (512) 476-9841, fax (512)
476-0130, attention Charlotte McCann).
6 Haiti: UN Remains Convinced of People's Determination to Vote, Inter Press
Service, Dec. 7, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
' Don A. Schanche, Populist Priest Wins in-Haiti, Is Backed by U.S., L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 18, 1990, at 1.
See infra Section B, "The Electoral Process."
Kathy Klarreich, Maverick Candidate Gains Ground, CHRISTIAN Sci. MONITOR,
Dec. 11, 1990, at 5.
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B. The Electoral Process
The 1987 Constitution called for the establishment of a
Provisional Electoral Council (the CEP or KEP) to be independent of
the army and other governmental structures. Despite constant
resistance from and harassment by the Namphy regime, this nine-
member body set up the elections of November 1987. This election
was drowned in blood in armed attacks on the polling stations by
Macoute forces instigated by Namphy. Namphy cancelled the
elections and blamed the violence on the CEP. He then called his
own elections for January 1988 (often called the "army elections") in
which Leslie Manigat was installed.
In 1990, under Trouillot, a new CEP was established. Under
the CEP were nine Departmental Electoral Bureaus (BEDs), one for
each of the nine departments of Haiti. Under the BEDs were the
Communal Electoral Bureaus (BECs). Finally, at the bottom of this
hierarchy, were the more than 14,000 registration and polling stations
known as Bureaux d'Inscription et de Vote, or BIVs.65 Each BIV
would have a President and a Secretary and perhaps many volunteers.
Each employee up and down the chain would have to have
authorization from a body higher up.
Given the military' manifest hostility to the electoral process
and their results, anyone involved can be at risk today, even if they
merely allowed their house to be used as a polling or registration
station (BIV). Many such houses were burned after the coup and
their occupants harassed and worse. If your client was involved in
any of this, get full details. Ask if they retain any of their documents
granting them their authority. If not, ask by whom and why they
were given that authority (e.g., "what is it about you that made X
think that you would be a good person to place in this position?").'
'6 Some clients may confusingly refer to these offices as "FNCD" offices. Officially
they were non-partisan. Nonetheless, these offices often were disproportionately staffed
by lavalas activists, who wanted and had the greatest stake in successful free and fair
elections.
" You should ask similar questions if your client held any position in any context,
for example, if your client was president, vice-president, secretary, treasurer, or delegate
in a neighborhood committee, was a mandateur, etc. See infra notes 67-82 and
accompanying text. Despite the erroneous January 1992 State Department report which
implied that only "prominent" persons are at risk, which has been refuted by the human
1993] HAITIAN ASYLUM ADVOCACY 361
C. Campaigners and "Mandateurs" (Election Observers)
Aristide's candidacy galvanized Haiti's poor, the majority of
the population, who saw him as the one person who could beat the
Duvalierists.67 There was a sense of euphoria and excitement --
young people came alive again and started working for the lavalas
movement and/or specifically FNCD,6" which had offices or
representatives (often "coordinateurs") throughout the country. In the
weeks before the election they campaigned for Aristide and FNCD's
other candidates, sometimes with a megaphone, getting around by
bicycle, motorcycle, boat, or on foot, with leaflets, T-shirts, and
other paraphernalia, advertising or even speaking at campaign rallies.
In each area FNCD's coordinateur, a few days before the election,
chose "mandateurs" to observe the voting and the counting of ballots
at polling places on election day. PDCH and the other parties also
had mandateurs.
Many Guantnamo Haitians were FNCD mandateurs, each
with a "manda" (mandate). The manda was an official paper
featuring FNCD's name in French and Creole, its rooster symbol
("coq qualitd"), 69 the names and signatures of its local and national
leaders, Turneb Delpe and Evans Paul, and an authorization of the
person to represent FNCD in that municipality or zone. "Vbt kok
rights reports and specifically by the March 9, 1993, memorandum by John Cummings,
head of INS' International Affairs division, some Asylum Officers are still obsessed with
"prominence." Show if you can that your client either was prominent himself, or was
intimately associated with or related to, others who were. See Memorandum from John
Cummings, Acting Director, Office of International Affairs to Asylum Division and
Refugee Division of the INS (Mar. 9, 1993) (on file with the New York Law School
Journal of Human Rights; also available from the Documentation Exchange, PO Box
2327, Austin, Tex. 78768 (512) 476-9841, fax (512) 476-0130, attention Charlotte
McCann).
'7 Tom Squitieri, Haiti Hungers for a Living, USA TODAY, Nov. 13, 1991, at IA.
See also Refugees in the United States.... WASH. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1992, at F2 ("It was
the poor who put Jean-Bertrand Aristide, Haiti's first democratically elected president,
into office two years ago.").
'6 Howard W. French, Haitians Overwhelmingly Elect Populist Priest to Presidency,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1990, at Al.
See Huell Howser, Watching the Dawn of a Democratic Day in Haiti, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 21, 1990, at El.
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kalite," or "Vbt 5," his number on the presidential ballot, meant to
vote for Aristide and the FNCD.7 °
On election day mandateurs were stationed near one or more
polling places and, after the polls closed at 6 p.m., looked on to
insure against vote fraud as the polling place's president, an appointee
of the local electoral office, counted the ballots ("bulletin"). 71
Sometimes keeping their own tallies, the mandateurs would sign to
certify the accuracy of the official one, and then go to the local
elections office with the president, who would submit the official tally
and ballots for forwarding to Port-au-Prince. Earlier in the day, the
mandateurs would have identified themselves to polling place
presidents by showing their mandas.
Under the aforementioned pressure from the United States,
the military, in a much-resented intrusion, had instructed local
headquarters and the Section Chiefs ("chef seksyon" in Kreyol, "chef
de section" in French), rural sheriff-like figures notorious for rights
abuses,72 not to disrupt these activities. But soldiers and Chef Section
70 A good picture of a ballot appears in MAGGIE STEBER, DANCING ON FIRE 84-85
(1991). See also NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS,
THE 1990 ELECTIONS IN HArrI (1991).
7' Robert I. Rotberg, Haiti's Remarkable Exercise in Democracy, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Jan. 3, 1991, at 19. Approximately 85 percent of the three million Haitians
were registered to vote at the time of the election. Haiti's Election Appears Peaceful,
CHI. TRIB., Dec. 17, 1990, at 3.
7 Kathie Klarreich, Haiti's New Government Built on Callfor Justice, S.F. CHRON.,
June 26, 1991, at 7. See also Memorandum from Mike Levy, Amnesty International
Country Group Coordinator for Haiti to John D. Evans, INS Resource Center Director
7 (Jan. 9, 1992) ("The chefs were intimately acquainted with their local populations.
That was the core of his continued power. By knowing everything that goes on, having
informants and "adjoints" to help him, he could keep in control. He would also know
if outsiders were coming in town . . . . The chiefs generally led the campaigns of
repression against local peasant organizations and were ferocious in acting against them,
even invading a church or riding up on horseback, dismounting, hiding in the grass and
stalking them carrying out a massacre of a youth organization. As to extortion by chefs
since their restatement (after the coup), it would be astonishing if they abandoned this
age-old practice. People had to pay to be released from prison, to avoid arrest, to avoid
theft, etc., repression of the media, and other issues.") (on file with the New York Law
School Journal of Hwnan Rights). The practitioner should obtain the Levy memo from
the Documentation Exchange, PO Box 2327, Austin, Tex. 78768 (512) 476-9841, fax
(512) 476-0130, attention Charlotte McCann, or from the New York Law School Journal
of Human Rights.
See also Summary of the Human Rights Situation in Haiti (Lawyers Committee
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aides, often present near polling places or while polling officials and
mandateurs carried the ballots to the electoral office, could identify
these officials and mandateurs73 and, after Aristide's ouster, take their
vengeance. Aristide retired the Chefs Section, replacing them with
communal police agents, but the military reinstated them after his
ouster.
Aristide's inauguration was scheduled for February 7, 1991,
the fifth anniversary of Duvalier's ouster,74 but Roger Lafontant, kept
off the ballot on a technicality, had sworn that it would never take
place. On January 6-7, 1991, Lafontant tried a coup.75 The military,
whose support he counted on, wavered in the face of huge protests
in the streets, and the coup failed.7 6  Lafontant was imprisoned.77
This demonstrated Aristide's strength: massive popular support,
especially in the poorest sections, such as Port-au-Prince's Citd
for Human Rights, New York, N.Y.), Dec. 6, 1991, at 2 ("This resurgence of section
chiefs is particularly ominous for Haitian asylum-seekers since most of them come from
rural areas under the control of these section chiefs. The asylum-seekers' attempt to flee
marks them as enemies of the military government and as supporters of Aristide and thus
the likelihood that they will face persecution for their political beliefs is substantial.").
Section chiefs and military officials were aware of the activities of mandateurs on
election day. See Memorandum from Mike Levy, Amnesty International Country Group
Coordinator for Haiti to John D. Evans, INS Resource Center Director 5-6 (Jan. 9,
1992) (stating that mandateurs "were actively participating in monitoring election fairness
and ensuring the interest of their party. The military might have a list of mandateurs as
many political party documents were stolen by the military. They might also get names
from informants. The traditional Duvalierist military (certainly the military through
1990 and after the coup) would consider a mandateur to be a political opponent on the
basis that the person is actively supporting the democratic process.") (on file with the
New York Law School Journal of Human Rights; also available from the Documentation
Exchange, PO Box 2327, Austin, Tex. 78768 (512) 476-9841, fax (512) 476-0130,
attention Charlotte McCann). See also Haiti, A Human Rights Nightmare (Lawyers
Committee for Human Rights, New York, N.Y.), Sept. 1992; Haiti, Human Rights Held
Ransom (Amnesty International, New York, N.Y.), Aug. 1992.
74 Howard W. French, Haiti Buoyant on Eve of Inauguration, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 7,
1991, at A3.
75 Howard W. French, Troops, Storming Palace, Capture Plotters and Free
President, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 8, 1991, at Al. Lafontant was one of the most widely
feared members of the Duvalier regime and a reputed torturer. Id. at A2.
76 Id. at Al.
"Id.
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Soleil, where almost all of the population had voted for him.78
D. Neighborhood Committees
After Duvalier's ouster, neighborhood committees (komite
katie) formed in many towns and areas to address local political and
community needs. Repressed by the ensuing dictatorships, they
sprang up or revived all over Haiti in 1990 and 1991 at Father
Aristide's express urging and inspiration. Vital "grass roots" popular
organizations whose elections, meetings, and activities were informed
by the "Lavalas" movement and reform enthusiasm, their members
were "Aristide fanatics," and Lafontant's coup only underscored the
need for them.79 Their goals were neighborhood beautification,
advocacy, improvement and development, and solidarity with
Aristide. °
They often held elections for president, vice-president,
secretary, treasurer, and delegates (first, second, and third); cleaned
and decorated their neighborhoods for days before Aristide's
inauguration and financed a huge celebration, replete with television
sets broadcasting the inaugural ceremonies live from Port-au-Prince;
met weekly to clean up the neighborhood; held weekly meetings;
discussed or had begun various projects, such as bringing drinking
water and building wells, roads, toilets, a school, a community store,
or an orphanage like Aristide's LaFanmi Selavi orphanage in Port-au-
Prince; repaired roads or a wharf; and taught literacy
(alfabetizasyon). 8 These groups usually met at a certain place, such
as a member's house or a yard or common area (gwo lakou).
' Howard W. French, Haitians Overwhelmingly Elect Populist Priest to the
Presidency, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1990, at Al. At one polling station, Aristide
received 172 votes while his nearest rival received only 3. Id.
" That coup failed due to "people power" when hundreds of thousands of Haitians
"took to the streets" in protest, a lesson the army never forgot when it shot and killed
protestors who took to the streets during the September 1991 coup.
"0 Michael Norton, Filth-Sensitive Haitians Scrub One of World's Dirtiest Capitals
Clean Block by Block, L.A. TIMES, July 29, 1990, at A27.
8' See id. One of Aristide's favorite slogans was "[wlith many hands, the load is
light." Howard W. French, Haiti Buoyant on Eve of Inauguration, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
7, 1991, at A3.
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Twenty to sixty members might attend, speaking about Aristide, local
needs, etc. Military informers may have attended secretly.
Community leaders and members often wrote official letters
to or met with local or national officials. In such letters or meetings
committee leaders might protest a military abuse, request money or
help for a community project, such as building a school or toilets, ask
for rakes, shovels, and other cleaning implements, or request soccer
balls for a tournament.
Letters would be signed by committee members8 2 in their
official capacities, e.g., committee president, vice-president,
secretary, treasurer, counselor, or delegate, and might have been
known to or found by the military, if not before the coup then after,
when it seized all government ministries, offices, and files. It would
likely have targeted their signatories for persecution as Aiistide
supporters or as anti-military, equating development and advocacy
with activism. One man claims he registered his name at a chapter
of Veye Yo (literally "watch them"), an Aristide-affiliated group, and
attended some demonstrations ("manifestasyon") and meetings, at
which informers may have been present. The military would have
raided the chapter headquarters after the coup, possibly finding his
name.
Beware of the word "member" in interviewing your client! Many Haitians use
"manm" (member) to denote a committee "leader" or "officer" (president, delegate,
etc.), as distinguished from "patisipan" (participant), which denotes what we would call
an "ordinary or rank and file member." "Were you a member of a neighborhood
committee?," asked of a "patisipan" who regularly attended and spoke at committee
meetings, may therefore elicit an extremely inaccurate "no."
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E. Relations with the Military
What has happened to thousands of young Haitians is
analogous to what happened in China after Tiananmen Square,83 or
to people sticking their heads above the water only to have a scythe
come along and chop them all off. After decades of repression and
suffering, the euphoria in Haiti from November 1990 to September
29, 1991, was palpable and resulted in tremendous grassroots political
activity." But relations with the military were always uneasy, its
allegiance uncertain, as events were to prove. Soldiers provided
"security" at campaign rallies, but they were the potential repressors.
Aristide wooed the military, :declaring in his inaugural speech
a "marriage" with the army and retiring many Duvalierist generals.85
After the coup, however, the military and Duvalierists, many of them
members of "Chefs Section" replaced by Aristide, took their
vengeance against all who had "stuck their heads above water" during
Aristide's candidacy and government.86 Ordinary people had become
mandateurs, presidents, or delegates of local committees. They had
signed letters, met with officials, and dared to question assertions of
arbitrary power by criticizing the military or a Chef Section on the
radio or speaking out at a public gathering. When the dream
crashed, the military and Duvalierists knew who to look for.
" See Elizabeth Kurylo, Should U.S. Troops Aid Haiti? Carter Wants U.N. Forces
Sent There, to Bosnia, THE ATLANTA J. & CONST., Dec. 11, 1992, at BI ("If it was
wrong to return Jewish refugees to Nazi Germany, and it was; if it was wrong to return
Chinese students to the People's Republic of China after Tiananmen Square, and it
would have been wrong; then it is wrong to send Haitians back to a place that the United
Nations, just last week, condemned for its 'flagrant human rights violations"') (quoting
Rolande Durancy, director of the Haitian Refugee Center).
" Bella Stumbo, From Horror to Hope; For the First Time in Decades, Haiti Has
a Popularly Elected President. Can He Steer His Country Away From its Bloody Past?,
L.A. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1991, Magazine, at 8.
' David Adams, Aristide Reconciles Army With the Poor, THE INDEPENDENT, Feb.
11, 1991, at 10.
" See Nathaniel Sheppard Jr., Haitians Hide From Police, Army, and Try to Flee
Rights Tragedy, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 10, 1992, at 3.
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F. The Coup on September 29-30th
There was sporadic violence in early 1990, including a
January massacre by soldiers and others in the town of Gervais" and
pre-inauguration terrorist incidents in the capitol, notably a fire at
Aristide's orphanage and youth center which claimed four lives."8
Late on Sunday, September 29, 1991, the military began its coup,
forcing Aristide to flee Haiti the next day. 9 The military prevented
people from taking the streets by indiscriminately killing and
wounding them throughout the country, especially in the poor areas
which were Aristide strongholds.' The military had learned from the
Lafontant coup, which failed due to massive public protest.9'
Tragically, on the first day of the coup a mob killed the PDCH's
Sylvio Claude.'
The military targeted anyone who had been pro-Aristide --
neighborhood committee presidents, mandateurs, etc. 93 Many houses
displayed Aristide photos; the military raided them, beating and
terrorizing their occupants. The military announced on television and
radio the names of about a hundred "terrorists" -- in reality,
pro-Aristide activists, some prominent, others not.' Many persons
learned that soldiers had come to their houses to arrest them and went
' Twelve Killed, Four Hundred Homes Burned in Haitian Land Dispute, CHI. TRIB.,
Jan. 22, 1991, at 8.
" Howard W. French, Haiti Buoyant on Eve of Inauguration, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7,
1991, at A3.
"Pamela Constable, OAS Ponders a Diplomatic Push in Haiti; Deposed Leader
Makes Appeal, Describes Coup, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 3, 1991, at 1.
90 See generally Human Rights Violations in Haiti Rival the Duvalier Era: Report,
Agence France Presse, Dec. 9, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
91 See Howard W. French, Troops, Storming Palace, Capture Plotters and Free
President, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1991, at Al.
92 Haitian President is Ousted; At Least Thirty Reported Killed as Army Troops
Mutiny, CIE. TRIB., Oct. 1, 1991, at 4.
93 Ron Howell, OAS Negotiations Boost Optimism in Haiti, NEWSDAY, Dec. 8, 1991,
at 15. The Haitian military killed as many as 1500 citizens who had supported Aristide
in the aftermath of the coup. Id.
" See generally Michael Tarr, Haiti Seeks Aristide 'Terrorists' Before OAS Talks,
Reuters, Nov. 2, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File (Haiti's military
named 45 aides and supporters of Aristide as planning:acts of terrorism).
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into hiding. 95 These are the people who fled to GuantAnamo and now
are seeking political asylum in the United States.
There is also evidence that the military and rural Chefs
Section have persecuted many persons repatriated from
GuantAnamo. 9 The evidence is based on United States government
documents, affidavits, and press reports which have appeared in
major newspapers, on World Monitor cable and other television
networks, and on National Public Radio. 97
II. The Institutional Settng: The Need for Quality Control
INS has screened in more than 10,730 Haitians from
GuantAnamo, all of whom must file for asylum within a limited,
possibly extendable period. Many have great claims, but INS has
predicted a high denial rate. 98
Historically, about ninety-nine percent of Haitian asylum
applicants lose," for reasons often unrelated to the merits of their
claims. You can win if you do quality work, which takes time. In
" Ron Howell, OAS Negotiations Boost Optimism in Haiti, NEWSDAY, Dec. 8, 1991,
at 15.
96 See AMY WILENTz, THE RAINY SEASON: HAITI SINCE DUVALIER (1989).
1 National Public Radio journalist Alan Tomlinson and Chicago Tribune journalist
Nathaniel Sheppard Jr. were nearly executed by rural paramilitary authorities for
confirming that the authorities had burned most or all of a village because it was
pro-Aristide. See Enforcers Detain Two U.S. Reporters in Haiti Village, CHI. TRIB.,
Feb. 14, 1992, at 5.
1 Lizette Alvarez, Three Haitians Granted Asylum Following Interdiction at Sea,
MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 2, 1991, at lB. From 1981 to April 1991, of the 22,000 Haitians
interdicted at sea, only 11 were brought to shore to pursue asylum claims. One INS
official stated that more than 99 percent of all Haitians who seek political asylum are
sent home to Haiti. Id.
" Racism, improper foreign policy considerations, and willful ignorance have
distorted Haitian asylum determinations, although the asylum grant rate for GuantAnamo
Haitians during the last year from INS asylum offices (in contrast to the immigration
judges) has been somewhat better due to improvements, although still inadequate, in INS
asylum officers and guidelines. See also Refugees' Chance at Asylum Slim, CHI. TRIB.,
May 28, 1992, at 5 (United States consulate official estimated that the number of
Haitians who apply for political asylum who will receive asylum is 0.1 to 0.2 percent).
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the "affirmative" context," the Asylum Officer makes a preliminary
assessment based on reading the asylum application and interviewing
the applicant. Then the Officer sends the application to the State
Department for an advisory opinion and usually grants asylum if the
opinion is favorable. That is your best chance of winning, but you
may not get a favorable opinion, or asylum, if you submit a cursory
asylum story.
Quality work means getting accurate details, patiently
surmounting the cultural and language barriers, knowing Haiti's
recent political history, asking questions like a detective,
cross-examining to check facts, taking breaks, reinterviewing, doing
at least three or four drafts, getting them critiqued, etc. Hastily or
incompletely developed asylum stories will lose. An asylum claim
can be twenty-five pages or more. Take the time. Don't take short
cuts on the merits, there aren't any. Others may pressure you to
rush, to interview more people. Resist them. You have only one
goal: to win asylum for this human being. You have no other duties
except those of the zealous advocate.
The client should be interviewed by an attorney experienced
and competent in doing Haitian asylum applications, or by an
attorney, law student, or legal worker under the direct, critiqued
supervision of such an attorney. The stakes are too high, the task too
difficult, to sacrifice basic standards of competence or quality control.
If you are a volunteer attorney, law student, or legal worker who
lacks extensive hands-on experience doing Haitian asylum
applications, your first questions should be, "Who is going to critique
my work?" and "Who is going to provide quality control?" °1
1 Guant~namo Haitians file their asylum applications with an INS Asylum Office.
Such filings are called "affirmative," in contrast to asylum applications submitted during
exclusion or deportation proceedings before an immigration judge. Persons denied
"affirmatively" and placed in such proceedings may request asylum from the judge. In
general, however, one's chance of prevailing is greater in the "affirmative" context. See
supra note 99.
"I Training materials on representing Haitian asylum applicants, including a
videotape of a mock client interview and a critique by experts, are available from the
National Immigration Project at (617) 227-9727. Other resource materials are constantly
being prepared, updated, created, and compiled, including an index on factual conditions
in Haiti, theme packets keyed to more than thirty commonly recurring fact patterns (e.g.,
on the persecution of members of neighborhood committees or church groups, of family
members or friends of activists, of persons who have put Aristide leaflets on their houses
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Competent supervision is essential. One excellent attorney
interviewed a Haitian for two and a half hours one morning and
thought he "had the story." After a brief discussion with a competent
attorney supervisor, the junior attorney realized that "we need to
reinterview this guy." Both attorneys then questioned him for four
more hours and the junior attorney reinterviewed him again for three
or four hours six days later.
The junior attorney in the example was exceptionally bright,
experienced in and dedicated to human rights law. He had read, as
he should have, recent human rights reports on Haiti. But he lacked
experience in Haitian asylum interview techniques and detailed
knowledge of background facts and questions. His initial interview
had failed to uncover not merely details but entire areas of inquiry;
he had not spent the requisite time or asked the right questions.
Between interviews the junior attorney composed a first draft
of the asylum story, which the supervisor critiqued, writing extensive
notes and follow-up questions on it. The critique was the basis of the
follow-up questions a few days later. The attorney wrote at least two
more drafts of the addendum, the chronological asylum story which
is the most important part of the application. The final product alone
did justice to the claim.
The result of these techniques -- interview, oral critique,
reinterview, draft, written critique, reinterview, second draft, further
critique -- is a winning claim: the alternative is a losing one, the first
step towards deportation. Insist on quality control.
or wore Aristide T-shirts, on prison conditions, etc.), and rebuttals of commonly
received but erroneous INS legal arguments, etc. The index and theme packets are
available through the Documentation Exchange in Austin, Texas (512) 476-9841,
(Charlotte McCann), the rebuttals through the National Immigration Project. The
practitioner should always know about the latest resource materials and legal and factual
developments and is therefore well-advised to consult the author at the Haitian Refugee
Center 1-800-749-8538 and/or attorney Merrill Smith at Church World Service in Miami
(305) 541-8040, an invaluable expert resource on individual Haitian asylum applications,
background facts and documentation on Haiti, and interviewing techniques with Haitian
refugees; and, for information on resource materials, Gail Pendleton or Dan
Kesselbrenner, an eminent and approachable asylum and immigration law scholar, at the
National Immigration Project.
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A. A Basic Principle
Interviewing Haitian asylum applicants is difficult due to
cultural and language differences and requires you to be a detective,
repeatedly asking specific questions and knowing what questions to
ask. You need to be patient, persistent, and familiar with recent
Haitian history. You have much to overcome.
The Haitians have been through an ordeal and are usually
separated from family, jobless, without much education, and suffering
almost unimaginable culture shock. They don't initially trust you or
the translator, and none are familiar with INS' proof and specificity
requirements. Tired or frightened, many nod "yes" to questions they
don't understand or say things just to please you; none understands
the process.
Start with some open-ended, what happened-type questions.
But they will never elicit the whole story or the requisite specificity.
Instead, the interviewer must be familiar with the whole realm of
possibilities, with the political context of Haitian life, and must ask
specific questions covering that realm. The attorney, law student, or
legal worker must be familiar with and ask questions based on
documented background facts.'02
B. Establishing Trust
You must establish trust with the client. This is difficult,
despite appearances, because you and the interpreter are authority
figures. In Haiti, where there is no rule of law, such figures are to
be avoided, not trusted. Talking about politics can get you killed.
The client will not immediately open up.
02 See infra notes 129-30 and accompanying text. You must document your client's
claim by citing specific passages from the latest human rights reports by Americas
Watch, Amnesty International, the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights (LCHR), the
Committee to Protect Journalists, Physicians for Human Rights, Caribbean Rights, and
the National Coalition for Haitian Refugees (NCHR), which publishes Haiti Insight, a
periodical newsletter updating Haitian political conditions and listing each month's
human rights violations. Another excellent source is Haiti: Resistance and Democracy,
a bi-weekly bulletin published clandestinely in Port-au-Prince. LCHR sometimes
publishes critiques of the State Department's annual Country Report on Haiti.
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You overcome this natural distrust with love and compassion,
understanding, explanations, and reassurances -- from both you and
the interpreter. Be patient. Your client's culture shock is real.
Show that you empathize and care. If someone is shivering, feed
them, let them warm up. Let your client get the feel of you. Ask
how they are doing, about living arrangements, work, and family.
Take your time, do not rush into questioning. Address your client in
the second person (i.e., "you"), and look at him or her, not at the
interpreter, establishing eye contact if possible. Your interpreter
must translate in the first person ("I"), never in the third person ("he"
or "she").
Your interpreter must be equally or more caring, always
sensitive, and never arrogant or impatient, which can be a disaster.
Haitian interpreters are suspect: "Will this get back to Haiti?" and
"Is this person a Macoute?" are unexpressed fears. Clients fear
Haitians more than they do non-Haitians. The interpreter should
reassure the client that he or she has no ties to the Haitian military.
Do not use an interpreter, no matter how nice or good, with family
links to past or present dictatorships.
The interpreter should introduce himself or herself and
promise the client that he or she will keep everything confidential.
Let the client know that you trust your interpreter:
This is Elsa Valbrun. She's a good person and is
here to help because I don't speak Creole. I trust her
and so can you. Like me, she does not work for
Immigration or for the Haitian government or have
anything to do with it, and she won't tell anyone else
anything you say.
Explain what your client is up against, and about the process,
confidentiality, and the need to tell the whole story. One may say:
Many people in the world want to live in the United
States, but this country has developed laws and the
Immigration agency to decide who can stay here and
who will be sent back to their home countries.
Immigration has brought you here from Guantdnamo
so that you can ask for asylum, not necessarily to
[Vol. X
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give it to you. It is not easy for Haitians and many
others to get asylum ('li pa fasil pou jwen azil
politik'). Over the last fifteen years or so,
Immigration has granted asylum to only about 1 of
every 100 Haitians and denied it to the other 99.13
Immigration will deny you asylum unless you can
meet the requirements of the asylum law.
Immigration is hard ('li di').
Explain that to gain political asylum ("azil politik") a person must
show a fear of persecution if returned to his or her homeland; coming
here only to work, to better one's economic conditions, or because
of poverty at home (phonetically "kbz de la miser") is inadequate.
Describe your role:
I am a lawyer, and my job is to help you try to win
political asylum so that you can stay in the United
States. I don't work for Immigration, nor does the
interpreter; on the contrary, we work against
Immigration and for you. If Immigration denies your
application, it will begin trying to deport you to Haiti.
Immigration has ordered thousands of Haitians
deported after denying their asylum applications. If
you let me, I'll help you make your application as
strong as possible so that you will have the best
chance of winning asylum. 'We give Immigration
your application and, in a few months, an
Immigration officer will interview you. I or another
attorney will go to the interview with you.
Immigration will send your application to the State
Department for its advice and, a few months later,
either grant or deny you asylum. Immigration
expects most Haitians to lose, so we have to do
excellent work for you to have a chance to win. If
you win, you can apply for permanent residence after
' See 138 CONO. REC. S11,960-61 (daily ed. Aug. 7, 1992) (statement of Sen.
Deconcini) (of the 7000 Haitians who have sought asylum at the United States embassy
in Haiti, only 82 have been granted asylum to the United States).
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a year. If you lose, Immigration will put you in an
exclusion hearing and make you prove to an
immigration judge why you should not be deported to
Haiti. You can ask the judge for asylum too, but it's
better and easier to win from the officer now than to
have to ask the judge later on, who may be harder.
Demonstrate these relationships. For example, I extend my
left arm straight out to my side, make a fist with my left hand, and
say, "Immigration is over here, and it can say 'no' to you ('li ka di
ou non') and deny you asylum and start trying to deport you."
Extending my right arm straight out to my right side and making a
fist with my right hand, I say, "We are over here, and we want to
help you get asylum so that you can stay in the United States."
Bringing my fists together in front of me, as in a clash, I say:
It is a battle or fight ('se yon batay,' 'nou gume')
between us and Immigration, not with guns or clubs
like in Haiti, but with words. We must show that you
have a good asylum claim and that, therefore,
Immigration should grant you asylum and not try to
deport you to Haiti. My only goal is for you to win
asylum so that you can stay here.
Stress that everything remains confidential and goes no further
unless the client agrees, that you won't put anything in the application
that's harmful, will read it back after you've written it, changing
anything as desired, and won't submit it unless the client approves,
and that Immigration and the State Department are supposed to keep
the application secret and never share it with the Haitian government.
Stress the need to tell a complete, truthful, and accurate story.
Let the client know what he or she is up against.
You need to tell the truth, not because I'm a priest --
I'm not -- but because I want you to win and, if you
don't tell the truth, you'll lose. In a few months an
Immigration officer will interview you on your
asylum application. The officer is not your friend and
will try to take your story apart, asking hard questions
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to see if it makes sense and if you are telling the
truth, including perhaps some tricky ones ('Ii ka dsdyd
trompd [phonetically "trompay," accent on the second
syllable] ou'). The officer compares your answers
with what you said in the application and will deny
you asylum if he or she thinks you're lying or that
your story doesn't make sense. So tell me the real
story, not what you think I want to hear or what
someone else told you to say; otherwise the
application will be wrong, and the officer may deny
you asylum. Remember, I won't put anything in the
application if it's bad for you or if you don't approve.
Your client must understand that there aren't any "correct answers"
and that he or she should never say anything just to please you.
Explain some basics.
Take your time; we're not in a rush. If you don't
understand a question, ask me to repeat it; don't nod
your head or answer if you don't understand! If you
can't remember something, just tell me you can't
remember; if you're not sure, say you're not sure;
you can approximate, use the word 'about' ('a peu
prd' or 'ver'). Don't exaggerate. If, for example,
two soldiers did something, don't say it was three,
say it was two. Don't make anything up. 'The truth
will set us free' ('la verite ap libere nou'). Also, no
matter what you told Immigration in Guantnamo,
don't stick to it if it wasn't true. I need to know what
really happened, regardless of what you told
Immigration in Guantnamo.
In a separate inquiry, ask your client what she actually said
in Guantnamo, explaining that INS may have retained notes of that
interview. Reassure your client: "You may have been afraid or
mistranslated, and we can explain that to the asylum officer if there
is anything incorrect in the notes." Be sure to stress that what you
need now is the full and true story, regardless of what she said on
any earlier occasion.
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C. Phrase-by-Phrase Interpretation
An asylum officer or immigration judge who doubts
credibility will deny asylum. Each seeks inconsistencies between the
asylum application, which you are preparing now, and your client's
live testimony, which the officer or judge will hear months or even
years from now. So the application must be complete and accurate.
One source of omissions and inaccuracies is lack of trust; another is
faulty interpretation.
The Haitians from Guantnamo do not speak French. You
need an excellent Creole interpreter. Never use an unqualified one,
family members, high school students, or anyone impatient, arrogant,
or tired. Use someone sympathetic, bright, fluent in both Creole and
English, and familiar with relevant political terms, e.g., mandateur,
PDCH, komite katie. For example, mistranslating "M' te mandate
pou FNCD" as "I voted for FNCD" obscures an entire area of
inquiry -- "mandate" means "election observer," not "voter."
Tell the interpreter to translate exactly what the Haitian says.
For example, if you ask, "How many soldiers came to arrest you?"
and the client responds in Creole, "The cow jumped over the moon,"
the interpreter should translate into English, "The cow jumped over
the moon," not argue with the client. Your interpreter, no matter
how good, must interpret only one phrase at a time. Otherwise much
of the story won't make it into English and other parts will be
inaccurately and incompletely translated. You'll miss key points and
clues to entire areas of inquiry, your application will be inaccurate
and omit entire areas, and INS, through no fault of your client's, will
deny asylum because of the supposed inconsistencies between those
omissions and inaccuracies and the later live testimony -- all because
you didn't insist on phrase-by-phrase interpretation. Is it fair? No.
Does it happen? All the time.
Without phrase-by-phrase interpretation -- which professionals
insist on -- you lose information whenever your client runs on, which
is common, or your interpreter begins to tire. Interpreting
phrase-by-phrase is easy. Instead of impeding spontaneity or the
flow, it enhances both. The client gladly falls into the pattern, since
every phrase is being interpreted, and easily remembers what he or
she wants to say next. The interpreter has less to remember. You
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understand everything your client is saying much better and more
quickly. Tell the client:
I want to hear your whole story, and we're not in a
rush. But its hard for an interpreter to remember lots
of sentences all at once. So say just one phrase at a
time, and then pause ("rete"), to give the interpreter
time to translate into English for me. Then you can
continue. If you say a lot without pausing, the
interpreter won't be able to remember everything, and
I'll get the story wrong. So say just one phrase at a
time.
But the interpreter is the key. No matter how often you tell
the client, you will not achieve phrase-by-phrase interpretation unless
the interpreter regulates the flow of words. You must instruct the
interpreter accordingly -- well before the interview and as often as
necessary during it -- to actively and affirmatively stop the client after
each phrase by physically putting up his or her hand in a stop sign
mode, so that he or she can translate what is being said without losing
track of anything.
Demonstrate the use of the hand as a stop sign. Until the
pattern is established and whenever it is broken, this is the only way
to regulate the flow of words. The interpreter's hand goes up
lovingly but firmly whenever necessary; this is neither impolite nor
aggressive, and you must overcome any initial shyness from the
interpreter. If at first the client doesn't know when to start up again,
the interpreter gently uses the hand in a beckoning mode.
Anything less than phrase-by-phrase interpretation will lose
important information, no matter how good your interpreter is. The
client, anxious to speak and not used to being interviewed, "runs on,"
forgetting that you, not the interpreter, must write down the story.
The best interpreter tires, and it is hard to remember more than a
phrase at a time, or at most a short sentence. Not speaking Creole,
you won't know of the problem until the INS interview, when
devastating holes and inaccuracies are revealed, perhaps irremediably
damning your client.
Interpreting phrase-by-phrase takes a minute to learn -- like
tying one's shoes -- but saves time, not to mention your client's
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claim. Don't accept excuses. It is part of the interpreter's job to use
this technique, and you are working to save a life. Professional
interpreters interpret phrase-by-phrase.
Otherwise, unbeknownst to you, but suspected by your less
lazy self, you and the story will remain strangers. Later on your
client will lack credibility when points come out before INS which
"were never told earlier." Actually, they were, but the interpreter
didn't interpret them, because you didn't insist on understanding
everything. This is a common problem neglected at your client's
peril; you must insist on phrase-by-phrase interpretation throughout
the interview.
Ill. Some Questions to Ask Haitian Asylum Applicants
The questions below are not exhaustive; the principle is to ask
fact-specific questions designed to elicit details and the whole story.
A. The Duvalier Period
In the Fall of 1985, especially after a November massacre of
students in Gonaives whose victims are still remembered today, a
nationwide youth revolt culminated in demonstrations which led to
Jean-Claude Duvalier's ouster on February 7, 1986. Did you take
part in any demonstrations in 1985-1986 against Jean-Claude
Duvalier? How many? Where? Exactly or approximately when?
Who organized them? A group? Who led the group? Exactly what
did you do? Chant? What were the slogans? Did you hold
placards? What did they say? How long did you participate? Who
got you involved? Were your activities secret? Why? Did you
know anyone who was killed or injured for anti-Duvalier activity?
Who? How did you know them? What happened to them? Did this
affect your own political ideas or opinions? How did this make you
feel? Were you or anyone you knew arrested or imprisoned for
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anti-Duvalier activities? °"
B. The 1980s
Were you involved in the 1980s with Sylvio Claude's Haitian
Christian Democratic Party (PDCH)'05 or with any other political
party or group? If so, which one? When did you join? Exactly
where (address)? Why? Who got you to join? Was your name
registered at party headquarters? Did Claude or any other party
leader(s) know you personally? Were you issued a membership card?
Did it have your photo on it? What was your role with the party, if
any? Did you go to meetings? About how many? Exactly where
(address)? When? About how many people attended these meetings?
Who spoke? Did you speak or ask questions? What did you say?
What did you ask? Was the government aware of the party's
activities in your area? Was the government aware of your activities?
Might there have been informers at any of these meetings who could
have identified you? Who else was active with you? What happened
to them? For how long were you affiliated with the party? Why did
you end your affiliation with it? Were the party's activities, or
yours, secret? Why?
'0 The foregoing questions relate to anti-Duvalier activities before his ouster. On
one occasion following his ouster, violence ensued at a demonstration. See The World,
L.A. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1986, at 2. On one occasion, approximately 10,000
demonstrators marched to honor victims of the Duvalier regime. Haitian troops fired
into the crowd, leaving eight dead and dozens injured. Id.
" Sylvio Claude, Haiti's leading opposition figure before the advent of Father
Aristide, was arrested many times in the 1980s under Duvalier. He founded the Haitian
Christian Democratic Party, one of the first political parties to operate openly in Haiti,
in 1979 after 22 years of political secrecy. Jo Thomas, Abstracts, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
24, 1979, at 10.
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C. The 1987 Election
Were you active with PDCH or any other party before or at
the time of the November 29, 1987 election? With which party?
What exactly did you like about that party? Did you have a
membership card? What was on it? Your photo? When exactly did
you get it? Who gave it to you? Where? At party headquarters?
Did you have to attend a certain number of party meetings or meet
any other requirements to get the card? Did you campaign for your
party in the weeks before the November 29, 1987 election? When
did you start doing so? Who enlisted you? When? Where exactly
did you campaign? On how many different occasions? How did you
get there (foot, boat, bicycle, motorcycle, car)? With whom? Did
you use a megaphone? Whose megaphone was it? What did you say
to people? Did you pass out literature? T-shirts? Other campaign
paraphernalia? Did you post party posters on walls? What was on
them? Did you pass out party newspapers? What was the name of
the newspaper? Where were they distributed? How many times?
With whom? Where did you get the literature, T-shirts, etc.? At
meetings? From whom? Did you attend meetings? About how
many times? Where exactly were they held? When? Did you ever
speak at them? About how many times? What exactly did you say
each time? Were you a leader? In what area? Did you ever speak
at a rally or to a group of people? About how many times? For each
time, how many people were in the audience? What did you say?
Where was each meeting or rally held? Who organized it? How?
If you spoke, were you the only one to speak? Who else spoke?
What did they say? Were any soldiers, Macoutes, Chef Section aides
(in rural areas), or informers present? How do you know? Were
they in uniform? Were they armed? What kinds of weapons? How
many of them were present? Did you recognize them? What were
their names? Had you or anyone you knew ever had problems with
any of them?
Did you urge people to vote for the PDCH's Sylvio Claude?
Were you personally known to Claude or to any other prominent
person in or outside of the party, such as the magistrat (mayor)?
How did they know you? Do you think the military was aware of
your campaign activities? Why exactly do you think that the military
knew who you were? Did you or anyone you know have problems
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as a result of your campaign activities? Recount each problem --
what exactly happened, when, where? If someone was imprisoned,
who, for how long, where, under what conditions? Were you or they
beaten, e.g., with a club ("baton"), or tortured, e.g., in the "djak"
position?"°  Did the authority who caused the problem have a
reputation for brutality? Based on what specific incidents? Was he
or she notorious as a Macoute since the days of Papa Doc?
Notorious for killing, raping, shooting, or imprisoning one or more
persons? Under what circumstances (e.g., if known, who, when,
where, why, how)? Notorious for taking land, business, or goods?
Whose? Under what circumstances?
Were you a mandateur (election observer) in the 1987
election? For which party? Who gave you the manda? What was
that person's position or role? Was this person a friend? A relative?
Someone you were close to? Was this person later persecuted? What
exactly was written on the manda? Do you still have it? Whose
names and signatures were on it? What were their respective
positions? Was your name written on it? What were your exact
duties as mandateur on election day? Where exactly were you
stationed? What time did you get there? What did you do there?
Did you have to identify yourself to the polling place president?
Were there any soldiers or, in rural areas, aides to the Chef Section
there? Did you recognize any of them? Had you or anyone you
knew had prior problems with any of them? Describe what happened
on November 29, 1987, election day, at the polling place where you
were stationed. Was there shooting? Did you have to run? Hide?
Were you nearly hit by a bullet? Suffer any other consequences of
your participation in politics at this time?
Investigate! For example, if a mandateur witnessed violence
10 In the "djak" torture position, a person is "suspended between two chairs by an
iron bar that [is] inserted between his tied hands and feet." This position allows the
torturers to administer blows to the body as the victim rocks back and forth. Yale
Complaint Details Torture by Haiti's Avril, THE CoNN. L. TRIB., Mar. 11, 1991, at 10.
The bar or club (baton) may be wooden. "The Djak is a widely used form of ill-
treatment in Haiti. A baton is wedged under the knees and over the arms of a prisoner,
who is then repeatedly beaten in different parts of the body." Haiti.: Human Rights Held
Ransom (Amnesty International, New York, N.Y.), Aug. 1992, at 8 (showing illustration
of djak position). In some places in Haiti's southern peninsula, the djak is also called
"kroutchou."
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at a polling place, did he or she see soldiers arrive? In jeeps, trucks?
Macoutes? How many soldiers or Macoutes? Were they armed? In
uniform? What did they say or do? Did they shoot? Above peoples'
heads or into people? Did they kill and wound people? About how
many did they kill? Wound? Did you see corpses? About how
many? Where exactly? Did you see this with your own two eyes?
If not, how do you know this is true? Who told you? How long
have you known that person? Did you trust him or her? Had he or
she ever lied to you? Did he or she have any reason to lie to you?
Did you believe what they told you?
Did any friend or party member have problems or have to
stop their political activities after the violent smashing of the
November 1987 elections? Are you still a member of that party?
Why not? What happened to disillusion you or make you quit, if
anything?
D. The 1990 Election
Were you involved at all in the election campaign prior to the
December 16, 1990 election? Were you a member of FNCD,
PDCH, or any other party? Why did you join? Who recruited you?
When and where? Did you campaign or urge people to vote for
FNCD? Aristide and other FNCD candidates? PDCH? Others?
Where and when? How many times? How did you get there (by
foot, motorcycle, boat, car)? With whom? Did you pass out
campaign leaflets ("trak")? T-shirts? Hats? Did you put up posters?
What else was on the literature, T-shirts, hats, posters? Aristide's
photo? Sylvio Claude's or another candidate's? FNCD's name and
"coq qualit" (in Kreyol, "kok kalite") symbol? Did you speak
through a megaphone? What did you say? Did you attend campaign
rallies? Speak at them? Who else spoke? Who organized them?
Were soldiers or Chef Section aides present? What exactly did you
say or do? Where was this?
Did you attend any meetings of campaign workers? About
how many? For each one: Where was it held? About when? Who
was in charge? What was its purpose? About how many persons
attended? Who were they? What happened at the meeting? Did you
speak? What exactly did you say? Who were FNCD's other
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candidates in your area besides Aristide? For deputy? Senator?
First, second, and third magistrat? Local administrative council
("casec") members? Did you know any of these other candidates
personally? How well? Were any of them related to you? Describe
the relationship (cousin, uncle, etc.). Did you campaign with any of
them? Work for any of them? For whom? In what capacity?
Which of these other candidates were elected? Were any of them
persecuted after the coup? Who? When exactly? By whom? What
exactly happened to him or her? How do you know this? Did you
see it with your own two eyes? Who told you about it? How old
was the person who told you?
Use the questions on campaign activities, but focus now on
the 1990 election, FNCD, and Aristide, with the caveat that any later
persecution likely would have happened after the coup on September
29-30th. Get details on the client's campaign activities and
relationships before and during the election, showing if.possible how
such activities and relationships brought your client to the attention
of local soldiers, Chef Section aides, or former Macoutes who, ten
months later -- after the coup -- would have remembered and sought
to persecute your client as a pro-Aristide, pro-democracy activist.
Were you an official election observer for a party on
December 16, 1990? Do you have a copy of the manda? Who
enlisted you? Why? Where? When exactly? Just a day or two
before the election? What exactly was written on the manda? Do
you have it? Whose names and signatures were on it? Describe it,
e.g., it includes the word manda, party name and writing in French
and Creole, party acronym (FNCD), names and signatures of national
leaders Turneb Delpe and Evans Paul and perhaps of local leaders,
the FNCD's coq qualitd rooster symbol, the mandateur's name and
the area he or she was designated to represent. Was there an FNCD
or Lavalas office in your town? Who was in charge of it? Was a
meeting of mandateurs held? Did you attend? Where? Was it held
just a day or two before the election? Who was in charge and how
many persons attended? Who were they? What happened at the
meeting? Did you speak? What exactly did you say? (Distinguish
any such meeting from other pre-election meetings, e.g., of campaign
workers, which you should also describe, using similar questions).
Why did you become a FNCD mandateur? Mandateur for another
party? Focus on the December 16, 1990 election and whether your
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client's activities came to the attention of any soldiers, Chef Section
aides, or former Macoutes who, ten months later, would have
remembered and sought to persecute your client as a pro-Aristide,
pro-democracy activist.
E. Election Day
What were your responsibilities on election day? Were you
stationed at or near one or more polling places? Where exactly?
Who was president and vice-president of each polling place? During
the day did you have to keep a certain distance away from it? Did
you urge people to vote for FNCD and its candidates? Were any
soldiers or Chef Section aides present? How many? What were their
names? Were they uniformed? Did they see and hear you? Did you
identify yourself to the polling place president? How? By presenting
your manda? Did you identify yourself to any soldiers or Chef
Section aides? To whom exactly? Did you talk with any of them?
Did any of the soldiers or aides remain at the polling place all day?
How many stayed all day? How many people were registered to vote
there? How many actually voted, if you know?
What time did the polls close? At 6 p.m.? Did you remain
at the polling place after 6 p.m. to observe the polling place president
count the ballots? Who else observed the counting? Other
mandateurs? For which parties? Do you know their names? Did
any soldier or aide to the Chef Section observe the counting? How
many of them? Were they in uniform? Identify them by name, if
possible. Did you have a separate tally sheet on which you recorded
the number of votes for each candidate as the president counted
them? Did the president hold up the ballots, or exactly how did he
count them? Did you have to certify by signing at the bottom of the
president's official tally that his or her count was correct? How
many such tallies did you sign? One for each election (e.g., for
president, deputy, etc.), or how? Did the other mandateurs sign as
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well? How exactly did you sign, e.g., your name "for FNCD?" Do
you remember how many votes each candidate for president got? For
deputy, etc.? When the counting was through, did you accompany
the polling place officials to the local electoral commission office?
Who else went? Other mandateurs? Any soldiers or Chef Section
aides? Did the president bring all the ballots along? Did you and the
others help carry them? Were you present at the local electoral office
late that night when the polling place president turned in the official
tally and ballots? Do you know the names of the electoral
commission officials? What exactly happened there that night? Were
other polling place presidents there as well, other mandateurs, etc.?
F. Neighborhood Committees and Popular Organizations
The popular organizations,"0 7  including neighborhood
107 The military has repressed all popular organizations. See, e.g., Silencing a
People: The Destruction of Civil Society in Haiti (Americas Watch, New York, N.Y.),
Feb. 1993, at 1-136 (discussing repression of peasant organizations, rural development
projects and groups, community and popular organizations, women's organizations,
youth groups, trade unions, literacy groups, students and educators, the Catholic Church,
Aristide government officials, the press, and dissenters possessing pro-Aristide leaflets
or alleged to support Aristide or the Lavalas movement); see also id. at 1-2 ("The range
of organizations targeted by the army's campaign of repression is exceedingly broad.
Since hostility to military dictatorship is widespread among Haitians, the army views
virtually any popular association as a potential conduit for organized opposition. As a
result, all gatherings not controlled by pro-military forces are suspect. Any sign of
public protest or dissent is swiftly and violently repressed. The tools of this repression
have been intimidation, arrests, beatings and murder . . . . 'The biggest change,' a
priest in the rural Northeast told us, 'has been in the social organization of society.
Things like konbits (collective work groups) and grain storage cooperatives - all of
which gave people hope - are destroyed now. Everyone is back to working and trying
to subsist on his own, and the powerful do what they want to the weak. The solidarity
is gone; it's each person for himself."'). See also Haiti, A Human Rights Nightmare
(Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, New York, N.Y.), Sept. 1992, at 33-34
("Haitian security forces and their agents have forbidden groups from meetings and have
persecuted certain individuals solely because of their membership in groups perceived
to be supportive of President Aristide. The Haitian armed forces have illegally arrested
and detained people based on their affiliation - real or suspected -- with pro-Aristide
groups . . . the military has systematically disrupted the operation of small-scale self-
help organizations promoting agricultural projects, literacy or neighborhood
improvements. Members of these organizations have been forced into hiding; many
thousands have sought escape .... A number of examples follow.").
A memo written by Mike Levy, Amnesty International Country Group
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committees (komite katie), peasant cooperatives (gwoupman), and ti
legliz church groups, were the backbone of the lavalas movement and
in many ways played as important a role in Aristide's election as the
F.N.C.D., the coalition of political parties which chose him as its
presidential candidate. Your client may have been a member of a
neighborhood committee in the late 1980s, perhaps disbanded due to
repression, and of another, or of the same one after its revival, from
late 1990 to 1991. Find out about all such involvements.
Were you ever a member of a neighborhood committee
("komite katie")? What was it called? In what section of what town
was it active? When was it first formed (perhaps years ago)? By
whom or what group of persons? For what purposes? Describe its
history, if known. When exactly did you join? Why? Who got you
to join? How did you go about joining? Did you have to be
approved? By whom? By the steering committee ("komite ki te
dirige gwoup-la")? About how many members did the whole
committee have? When you joined, who was it's president?
Vice-president? Secretary? Treasurer? First, second, and third
delegates ("delege")? Counsellor ("konse")? Were elections held
after you joined? When exactly? Who ran against whom for
president? Vice-president? Secretary? Treasurer? First, second,
and third delegates? Counsellor? Who won? Did you run? Why?
Why not? Were you elected? (List names and positions if the client
accurately recalls them after you cross-examine him or her to
double-check.)
How often did the committee meet? Irregularly? About
every week, two weeks, month? Where? At someone's house, or in
a yard or communal area near someone's house? How were
Coordinator for Haiti is not an official Amnesty International publication but contains
a wealth of useful information on neighborhood committees, the dangers of repatriation,
the difficulties of hiding in other areas, the nature of the Lavalas movement, vigilance
brigades, peasant and popular organizations, the military's extreme paranoia and
repression, mandateurs, the section chief system and their "adjoints," abuses, and power.
Memorandum from Mike Levy, Amnesty International Country Group Coordinator for
Haiti to John D. Evans, INS Resource Center Director (Jan. 9, 1992). The practitioner
should obtain the Levy memo from the Documentation Exchange, PO Box 2327, Austin,
Tex. 78768 (512) 476-9841, fax (512) 476-0130, attention Charlotte McCann, or from
the New York Law School Journal of Human Rights. Obtain and study the Levy memo
and quote from it to support your client's claim.
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members informed of meetings? By the delegate? In writing? By
going to members' houses?
About how many people usually attended? Did you attend?
About how many times? Did you have any duties? Who spoke at the
meetings? What was discussed? Did you speak? About how many
times? Were you one of the leading speakers? What exactly did you
say each time, word for word ("chak mo ou td di")? What are the
exact words which came out of your mouth ("mo dxakt ou t6 pald,
mo dxakt ki tt soti bouche-ou")? Why did you say those things? Did
you stand up when you were speaking? Did you ask questions?
Often? What exactly did you ask? Why?
Do you think there were any military informers present at any
of the committee's meetings? At many of them? Were local
authorities, i.e., the military, Chef Section, mayor, etc., aware of the
committee's activities? Were they aware of it meetings? Were they
aware of your role in the committee? Get details chronologically on
the committee's leadership, goals, activities, projects, importance and
visibility, and your client's role.
What were the purposes and goals of the neighborhood
committee? Supporting Aristide? Being a forum for political
discussion? Watching out for military abuses? Organizing anti-
Zenglendo vigilance brigades? Neighborhood clean-up and
empowerment? °8 Were the committee's members strong Aristide
partisans? Was it affiliated with FNCD? With Lavalas? Did its
leaders write and send any letters? Describe each one. Who wrote
it? What did it say and ask for, in detail? Who signed it? In his,
her, or their official capacities, i.e., stating their positions? Did you
sign? In your official capacity, i.e., stating your position? To whom
was it addressed? To Aristide? To Prime Minister and Minister of
Interior Rend Preval? To the head of the transportation department
0 "One of the most aggressive, non-violent acts in the post-Duvalier period was to
take responsibility for and pride in one's own street .... Even now, cleaning streets,
and anything else which improves the daily life of the people which is accomplished
without government participation is seen in Haiti as a very definite political act as
threatening as a demonstration." Memorandum from Mike Levy, Amnesty International
Coordinator for Haiti to John D. Evans, INS Resource Information Center Director 4
(Jan. 9, 1992) (emphasis added) (on file with the New York Law School Journal of
Human Rights; also available from the Documentation Exchange, PO Box 2327, Austin,
Tex. 78768 (512) 476-9841, fax (512) 476-0130, attention Charlotte McCann).
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(TPTC)? To the local mayor? To whom was it delivered? Who
delivered it (e.g., the committee's delegate)? Where (e.g., mayor's
office)? By hand? How did the deliveree get it to the addressee?
Did the deliveree confirm such delivery? Confirmation to whom
(e.g., mayor telling committee's president that he or she personally
delivered the letter to Preval or to an assistant the previous week in
Port-au-Prince)? Was any response received from the addressee?
What was the response? Did the letter achieve its goal (e.g., a
request to the head of TPTC for tools and money to hire employees
to build a community or literacy center)? Give detailed information
for each letter the client signed or the committee sent (its exact or
approximate date, contents, signatories, manner of delivery, any
response received, etc.). Such letters are important -- the military
raided government ministries after the coup and may well have found
such letters and sought to arrest and imprison their signatories. What
happened to the addressee after the coup? Do you know if the
military raided his office, seized his papers, or arrested him? Might
your letter(s) be in the hands of the military?
Did you on behalf or as part of the neighborhood committee
ever meet with anybody, such as the mayor? With the government's
delegate to your department of Haiti? With the presidents, delegates,
or anyone from other neighborhood committees? How many such
meetings, or others, did you attend? For each meeting, who
attended? Who else? When did it occur? Exactly where (the
mayor's office)? About how long did it last? Why was it held?
Whose idea was it? What was discussed? What happened in it?
Was the military or Chef Section aware of the meeting, its purpose,
your participation in it? How do you know or why do you think so?
What was the result of the meeting? Get detailed information in
chronological order on all such meetings, with whom held, who
participated, etc.
Did you ever speak with or get any written notice or
information to any radio journalists? For each instance, why? About
when? Where? Which journalist or journalists? For which stations?
Was the military aware of the journalist's activities? Why do you
think so? What was the content of the information released (in
detail)? If you received a letter or release, did you sign it? Stating
your position with the committee? Who else signed? Stating their
positions? Was the letter or release controversial? Why? Was the
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information broadcast on the air? How many stations broadcast it?
For each broadcast: What date and time was it? What exactly was
broadcast, as precisely as you remember? Was your name and
position in the committee broadcast (e.g., a letter to Preval criticizing
local military officials, signed by your client as president and other
committee leaders, released to a journalist and broadcast in full with
names and positions of signatories)? Did you hear it broadcast with
your own two ears? On whose radio? Where, at home? Were you
listening intentionally, just to hear if it would be broadcast on that
station? How many broadcasts did you hear with your own two ears?
If it was broadcast but you didn't hear it, how do you know it was
broadcast? Who told you? For each such person, what reason do
you have to believe him or her? Were there any consequences of the
release or of the broadcast or broadcasts? Exactly what were they?"°
What were the projects of the neighborhood committee? Did
it clean up the neighborhood during the week before Aristide's
'0 Radio is Haiti's chief medium of public discourse, and people often brought
complaints to and were interviewed on stations, including Radio Soleil and Radio
Lumiere, those of the Catholic and Protestant churches, and many others. See, e.g.,
Silencing a People: The Destruction of Civil Society in Haiti (Americas Watch, New
York, N.Y.), Feb. 1993, at 107 ("In Haiti, radio broadcasts are the most important
sources of new information for most people, particularly in rural areas. After the fall
of Jean-Claude Duvalier in 1986, radio stations began to report abuses by the authorities.
Some stations opened their microphones to the victims of violence and arbitrary arrest,
providing an extremely important forum for communicating information about human
rights conditions in the country and for stigmatizing those responsible for abuse. Since
the September 1991 coup, army attacks on radio stations have drastically restricted press
freedom. Nine radio stations were destroyed or shut down after the coup."); Attacks on
the Press: A Comprehensive Worldwide Survey (Committee to Protect Journalists, New
York, N.Y.), 1992 & 1993 editions; Bouche Pe: The Crackdown on Haiti's Media Since
the Overthrow of Aristide (Committee to Protect Journalists, New York, N.Y.), Sept.
1992; Committee to Protect Journalists Index on Censorship (Committee to Protect
Journalists, New York, N.Y.), July 1992 ("The long shadow of Papa Doc: The media
have been silenced and journalists killed. But the opposition to the government which
threw out Father Aristide is growing."); Reverting to Despotism, Human Rights in Haiti
(Americas Watch, New York, N.Y.), Mar. 1990, at 83 ("the radio is the most important
source of information .... It has become almost routine for victims of government-
sponsored abuses to describe their plight over the radio, particularly since legal avenues
of recourse have been so meaningless."); The More Things Change ... Human Rights
in Haiti (Americas Watch, New York, N.Y.), Feb. 1989, at 75 ("With 80 percent of the
country illiterate ... Haiti's radio stations are the most important medium for informing
the populace."). See also infra Section G, "Radio Appearances."
390 NYLS JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS [Vol. X
inauguration? If so, for how many days? Doing what exactly (e.g.,
sweeping, decorating, painting walls, etc.)? With what implements
(rakes, brooms, etc.)? Obtained from whom (e.g., from the mayor
or the government's delegate after formal request)? Did the
committee hold a celebration on inauguration day, February 7, 1991?
If so, where exactly (e.g., in a big yard or communal area)? What
time did it start and end (it might have lasted until 4 a.m.)? How
many people attended? Who paid for the food and refreshments
(e.g., the vice-president of the committee, contributions from
members)? Were there televisions at the celebration broadcasting the
inaugural ceremonies live from Port-au-Prince? How many, set up
how? Did the committee clean the neighborhood before any other
holidays (e.g., saints' days)? Which ones? In each case for how
many days prior thereto? Did the committee have weekly clean-up
sessions? If so, what day, where did it meet, at what time?
Did the neighborhood committee have any of the following
projects -- bringing drinking water to the area; building wells, toilets,
roads, a wharf; repairing any of them (name each one separately
again in your question); teaching literacy (alfabetizasyon) to adults;
building or getting monies to build a school, a community store, or
an orphanage like Aristide's LaFanmi Selavi orphanage in Port-au-
Prince? For each project, was it discussed at committee meetings?
If'so, did you talk about it? Was it the subject of any letters sent by
the committee to any government authority? Was it the subject of
any meetings with the mayor, other committees, the deputy, the
government delegate, a representative of World Vision or another
international agency, etc.? Was any work done? When? Exactly
where? What was accomplished (e.g., a wharf was rebuilt, the
neighborhood was kept clean, a soccer tournament was organized)?
Were committee members employed on the work? Paid? By whom?
Who arranged this? How? Did you or another committee member
help get the jobs, e.g., by contacting the mayor or a government
delegate?11° Did any of these activities provoke any negative reaction
110 Committees had many ideas but fewer resources. Stress what was done -
clean-ups, a celebration on inauguration day, political discussions, signed letters,
meetings with officials; the committee's importance and visibility as a leading
pro-Aristide organization with a large membership; the probability of informants at
meetings; any friction with local military officials or Chef Section aides; and your
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(criticism, threats, mockery, menacing gestures or expressions, etc.)
at the time? Give full details.
In all of this, clearly identify the client's own actions. Many
will speak quite naturally in terms of "we" and "us," which is fine,
but always try to identify the client's individual role.
G. Radio Appearances
Haiti is a largely illiterate society with few telephones and
unreliable mail. The Krey~l radio stations played a vital role as a
national and community bulletin board, even for personal messages.
They were also responsible for disseminating Aristide's sermons to
the countryside. It is not unusual for not otherwise "prominent"
individuals to have spoken on the radio.'11
Did you ever speak on the radio? How many times? For
each time, when exactly? On what station? What about? For about
how long? What exactly did you say? Did you identify yourself by
name? Were you interviewed by a journalist? What was his or her
name? Was the interview broadcast live? If taped, was it broadcast
later? Did you hear it with your own two ears? Did friends or
relatives hear it? List names of all persons who said they heard it.
Did you suffer any consequences as a result of the broadcast? What
exactly? Provide details.
H. The September 1991 Coup Against Aristide
Where were you when you heard the news (probably late
evening of Sunday, September 29th)? Did you take to the streets?
With whom? With a megaphone? If so, what did you say through
it? What did you do in the streets?- Did you stay on the streets
during the night of the 29th? Did you sleep? Go home to rest at
some point? Did you go back out on streets on the 30th? Describe
client's prominence, e.g., as committee president, a main speaker at meetings, a
signatory of letters, an initiator of meetings with officials, a speaker on radio, someone
known to the military or a Chef Section.
.. See supra note 109.
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the 30th, the first full day of the coup, in detail. How long did you
stay in the streets on the 30th? Was there shooting? Did you see or
hear it? Did you see anyone shot? Killed? Arrested? Beaten?
Abused? Name and describe the victims and what you saw. Did you
see bodies? At what intersections? Blood? Where (describe in
detail, on head, shoulders, stomach, throat, face, on street, which
intersections, etc.)? Bullet wounds on bodies? Where? Did you
hear of arrests? Did you hear of persons sought for arrest? Killed?
Shot? Beaten? Abused? Who told you these things? Is he or she
reliable? How close to your house was all of this, the shooting, the
bodies, etc.? What happened to others? What else did you hear?
See? Do? Was the military retaking the streets by the afternoon of
the 30th? Where did you go? Back home? Into hiding? Where did
you spend the evening and night of the 30th? Describe in detail
(same questions) what you did on Tuesday, October Ist, and if
relevant, on following days.
I. Arrests or Attempted Arrests
Did soldiers (or in rural areas the Chef Section or deputies or
aides to the Chef Section) come to arrest you or a relative? What
happened to you or them? Describe each problem. Exactly when
and where did it happen? Did you see them with your own two eyes
("ak deusyeu-ou")? Were they in uniform? What kind? Were they
armed? With what kinds of weapons? Did you know any of their
names? Recognize any of their faces? Who were they? Where were
they stationed? Did any of them have a reputation for brutality?
Based on what? Did they knock on the door? Who opened? Did
they barge in? Who seemed to be in charge? What exactly did they
say? In what manner (friendly, mean, angry, furious, etc.)? Did they
ask for you by name? Who else was home? Did they beat you?
Your father, mother, brother, anyone else?
Did they arrest anyone? Who? Did they say why they were
arresting him or her? Where were they taken? How long was the
person held? Under what conditions (e.g., in a small, overcrowded
cell, no room to lie down, mosquitos, fleas, and ticks, no medical
care, toilet, or change of clothes, only food was watery corn meal,
beatings, torture, taunts, etc.)? How did each incident make you
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feel? How did it affect your political beliefs? Who else saw the
soldiers (or Chef Section aides) who came to arrest you? What are
the names of these witnesses? Are any in the United States? Where
(city, address, phone number)?
J. Persecution for Leafleting, Posting Aristide's Photo's, Etc.
The Haitian military has killed and arrested persons or their
relatives, and burned down people's houses, merely for having posted
Aristide leaflets on the outside of their houses or found them in
possession of such materials."' It is therefore essential in every case
to ask your client whether questions like the following: Did you post
any Aristide leaflets on your house? If so, how many? What did
they say on them? Was his picture on them? Were they prominently
displayed, e.g. ont he outside wall facing the street? Did any.
authorities (section chief or his aides, soldiers, Duvalierists, etc.)
know that you had posted these leaflets? How did they know? Is
your house close to the street? On one of your town's main streets
or boulevards? Situated close to a military barracks?
Try to show that authorities in town were aware of your
client's pro-Aristide sympathies, i.e. had seen or probably had seen
these leaflets. Did you have any Lavalas or otherwise pro-Aristide
materials in your house? Slogans up outside your house? Inside?
What did they say? Given the Haitian military's extreme repression
of dissenters for having posted or possessed such materials or
slogans, no interview or asylum application is complete without
having thoroughly investigated this area by asking such questions.
1 See Silencing a People, The Destruction of Civil Society in Haiti (Americas
Watch, New York, N.Y.), Feb. 1993, at 119-24 (discussing repression of dissenters,
possession or distribution of pro-Aristide leaflets and publications, and documenting 16
related incidents); Haiti: A Human Rights Nightmare (Lawyers Committee for Human
Rights, New York, N.Y.), Sept. 1992, at 24-25 (a man accused of having photos of
President Aristide was told that "military authorities hold him responsible for sending
pro-Aristide tracts and photos of Aristide to the city"); id. at 30-31 ("even possessing or
circulating pictures of President Aristide usually triggers an arrest. In a number of
cases, the military has brutally punished entire communities where such pictures . . .
have appeared"); Pamela Constable, Killing of Three Haitian Activists Heightens Fear
of Rights Abuses, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 26, 1992, at 36.
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K. Persecution of Relatives or Associates
Ask about the political activities and associations of your
client's relatives (immediate and otherwise, ask about them one by
one) and colleagues, friends, and associates. The Haitian military has
murdered, arrested, and otherwise persecuted people just because
they were related or a colleague of an activist or of someone thought
to be anti-military. 11
3
L. Warnings and Establishing the Reliability of Informants
If soldiers came to arrest you but you heard about this from
one or more persons who warned you about it and told you to get
away ("degaje ou!"), who warned you? Name each person. For
each, how many different times did he or she warn or inform you of
the latest news? For each such occasion, where were you at the
time? At home? In hiding? Did the person go out of his or her way
(e.g., come to you in hiding, at night and at personal risk, bringing
you food and warning you "not to return because the soldiers
returned to the house yesterday asking for you")? Exactly or about
what day and time of day was it? What were the exact words in full
which came out of his or her mouth ("tout mo egsakt kite soti
'" See generally Silencing a People, The Destruction of Civil Society in Haiti
(Americas Watch, New York, N.Y.), Feb. 1993; Report of the Fact Finding Mission of
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in Haiti, Dec. 4-6, 1991 ("There is a
pattern of harassment of followers of President Aristide or their relatives."); Haiti: A
Human Rights Nightmare (Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, New York, N.Y.),
Sept. 1992, at 19 ("When the soldiers could not find Jean Claude, they arrested his wife
and his three-month old child"); Haiti, Human Rights Held Ransom (Amnesty
International, New York, N.Y.), Aug. 1992, at 9 (victim's "two sisters should be
arrested too"); id. at 21 (wife's home searched); id. at 37 (mother killed one day after
son's arrest); id. at 38-39 (brother of activist shot dead); id. at 39 (military searched
brother's home). See also Amy Wilentz, Introduction to MAGGIE STEBER, DANCING ON
FIRE 10 (1991) ("If you were perceived as close to certain key figures, no matter in what
capacity - as a driver, a cousin, or a colleague a decade ago - you might be targeted
for assassination.").
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bouche-li")?114
Did the person say any of the following: How many soldiers
came? When they came? Who they asked for? Whether they came
to your house? In jeeps or trucks (camion)? Whether they were
armed? In uniform? Whether they were friendly, nasty, angry
(fache), furious? What they said exactly? Whether they asked for
you by name? Whether they said or indicated why they wanted to
arrest you (e.g., "Maxy told me that one of the soldiers, after beating
up my mother and arresting my brother in my place, joked that 'when
we find him, Aristide will surely come to get him released, since he's
so uppity and fresh [fr~kan]"')?
Establish the credibility and reliability of each informant to
show that your client's reliance on his or her warning was
reasonable. Why did you believe this person's information? How
well did you know him or her? For how many years? Was he your
best friend? One of them? For how long? Was he related to you?
How? How old was he? Was he employed? Responsible? Honest?
Respected? Did he have a reputation for truthfulness? Have you
ever known him to mislead or lie to you? To anyone? Did he have
any reason or motive to do so? Did he seem sincere, anxious for your
welfare, upset? Did he love you or a member of your family? Was
he in full control of all of his faculties?
Did the informant say how she learned the information?
Whether she witnessed it with her own eyes and ears ("ak deje-li")?
Whether she learned it from someone else? If so, from whom, and,
for each such secondary informant: How would that person have
known? Was that person believable? Did your informant say what
the third party said to her? (For example, "Jeanne told me that three
soldiers came to your house yesterday looking for you."). For each
informant, did anyone else later confirm his or her warning? The
client may have received warnings from more than one person.
Document each warning and the credibility and reliability of every
14 Your client won't immediately understand this question, so repeat the following
instruction, with examples, until he or she does: "Say the exact words which came out
of his [the informant's] mouth, as if you were him, to the best of your memory." An
appropriate response might be, for example, "Jean told me, 'Three soldiers returned to
the house yesterday asking for you." In the application, to preclude unnecessary
problems later on, preface with, "she spoke to me approximately as follows: 'Three
soldiers returned .....
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informant. Use the questions in the preceding paragraphs.
Was it common knowledge that soldiers had come to your
house to arrest you? Did everyone know? How or why (e.g., "I was
well known in Port de Paix as the president of KKM, one of the
leading pro-Aristide neighborhood committees, and it was news in my
section of town when, two days after the coup, two jeeps full of
soldiers descended on my house to arrest me and, not finding me,
beat my mother and father")? Your goal is to show that a reasonable
person would have taken the warning(s) seriously and acted
accordingly, i.e., gone into hiding.
M. Imprisonment
Prison conditions in Haiti are hellish and constitute
persecution, regularly including torture and many forms of
mistreatment. Many rights reports describe such conditions in
chilling detail, sometimes describing Fort Dimanche and other
infamous national prisons."' Extortion is a common feature of
' See, e.g., Haiti, A Human Rights Nightmare (Lawyers Committee for Human
Rights, New York, N.Y.), Sept. 1992, at 47-50:
While soldiers routinely torture and beat prisoners and detainees in
prisons and detention centers throughout Haiti, conditions in Haiti
prisons are also life-threatening. In our 1990 report Paper Laws,
Steel Bayonets, we noted: "The conditions of detention in prisons
constitute severe and systematic violations of both Haitian law and
international standards relating to the treatment of prisoners and
detainees. Overcrowding, poor food, and lack of access to water,
medical care and legal counsel characterize Haitian prisons." The
prison in St. Marc provides a particularly vivid example of the deep-
rooted problems and how the coup has exacerbated an already
appalling situation .... [Clonditions were inhuman: disease was
widespread, overcrowding severe and beatings routine ....
[Cionditions were abominable, including deficient food, horrendous
sanitary problems, serious overcrowding in cells and lack of any
clean water or medical care .... mhe situation in St. Marc has
not improved at all. In particular, the prisoners described a
pervasive system of corruption where detainees must constantly bribe
prison guards to avoid ill-treatment and to obtain the barest
necessities for survival ... must pay to avoid being tortured ....
mhe justice system in St. Marc has been completely paralyzed and
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section chief and military repression in Haiti. 16
If the client or anyone relevant was imprisoned, give the
prison's name and the approximate dates and length of imprisonment.
Was the prisoner charged, given reasons for his or her imprisonment,
given a meaningful hearing? Was the hearing simply before the head
of the prison or before a "judge"?"t7
... the only way to obtain one's release from prison is to buy it
. . . . [A]buses and arbitrary arrests followed by demands for
payments for release or not to beat detainees are common practice
in the countryside. Peasants thus unwittingly finance this systematic
and all-pervasive repression.
See also Haiti. Human Rights Held Ransom (Amnesty International, New York, N.Y.),
Aug. 1992, at 22-24 (reporting on prison conditions, extortion, and overcrowding, and
describing conditions as "extremely harsh, with lack of hygiene, severe ill-treatment and
official corruption"); Paper Laws, Steel Bayonets (Lawyers Committee for Human
Rights, New York, N.Y.), Mar. 1990, at 93-108 (discussing the National Penitentiary,
the Investigations and Anti-Gang Service (formerly "Recherches Criminelle"), and the
jails in Gonaives, Port-de-Paix, and St. Marc).
', This is so not only in the prison context; Haiti's "kleptocracy," or government
by thieves from the lowest to highest levels, is well documented. Section chiefs and
prison officials require payment of bribes or "fines" to avoid arrest, to get released from
prison, to be transferred to a less horrible prison cell, and for other reasons. See supra
note 115; Haiti, Human Rights Held Ransom (Amnesty International, New York, N.Y.),
Aug. 1992, at 13 ("An increasingly common form of repression has been the extraction
of money . . . particularly in the countryside, to avoid arrest or ill-treatment, or to
secure better prison conditions or release from detention. This has happened in political
and non-political cases alike .... [Victims have been forced to sell their possessions -
- livestock, crops, grains... 'protection money"'); id. at 15 ("A peasant from Ravine
Desroches. .. described how his home was raided . . . by the local chef de section.
. . They took most of his belongings and arrested him, his son and his nephew. They
were accused of being 'communists,' beaten severely and kept in detention for several
days... Extortion was also reported in the prisons"); id. at 15-16 ("peasants reported
that their homes had been burned after they refused to pay a 'tax' to the local authorities.
A foreign television crew trying to do a report on the incident was arrested by the local
chef de section and was only saved from execution because of a dispute between the
arresting chef de section and another chef de section who claimed the crew was in his
jurisdiction. According to local human rights groups, many peasants refused to say they
have been victims of such practices by the local authorities, or refuse to disclose the sum
they paid, for fear of reprisals.").
117 Haiti lacks an independent judiciary; every rights report documents Haiti's lack
of any rule of law. See, e.g., Silencing a People: The Destruction of Civil Society in
Haiti (Americas Watch, New York, N.Y.), Feb. 1993; Attacks on the Press: A
Comprehensive Worldwide Survey (Committee to Protect Journalists, New York, N.Y.),
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Describe prison conditions -- overcrowding (cell size, how
many prisoners squeezed in, whether they were unable to lie down
simultaneously); lack of toilets (only a filthy bucket reeking of
excrement, how often was it emptied?) and food (a watery corn
meal); lack of soap, change of clothes, medical care, recreation;
beatings and torture; prevalent diseases, including diarrhea,
tuberculosis, and severe malnutrition; omnipresent mosquitos, ticks,
flies; prisoners covered with sores (describe); prisoners dying from
such conditions. Could you hear other prisoners complaining,
moaning, screaming in pain, being beaten? Was there a prison yard?
Describe it.
Following your client's instructions, get up and pace off in the
interviewing room the cell's length and width ("from here to here?").
Did the prisoner or a family member have to pay a bribe to secure
the prisoner's release? To whom? Would the prisoner otherwise
have been imprisoned indefinitely? Did family members bring food
and, if so, who? Would the prisoner otherwise have starved? Did
the prisoner suffer any lasting effects of imprisonment (e.g., couldn't
sit for three months because of posterior swollen from beatings, had
to go to the hospital, etc.)? Describe and seek medical evidence
where appropriate. Did you escape? Was it a prison, a jail, a
section chief's house, a coup-like cage, a barracks?
N. A Note Regarding Lengths of Time and Distance
In general, applicants are poor at accurately describing
temporal and spatial relationships and dimensions. Haitian life is
different from life in the United States. Your client's descriptions of
all of the following may vary from time to time -- how long one
event happened after another, dates, how far one place is from
another, and the time of day at which something occurred. Clients
1992 & 1993 editions; Bouche Pe: The Crackdown on Haiti's Media Since the
Overthrow ofAristide (Committee to Protect Journalists, New York, N.Y.), Sept. 1992;
Committee to Protect Journalists Index on Censorship (Committee to Protect Journalists,
New York, N.Y.), July 1992; Reverting to Despotism, Human Rights in Haiti (Americas
Watch, New York, N.Y.), Mar. 1990; The More Things Change... Human Rights in
Haiti (Americas Watch, New York, N.Y.), Feb. 1989.
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sometimes misunderstand the concepts "before" and "after."
This underscores the general need, for example, in measuring
the size of a prison cell, to approximate, to triple- and
quadruple-check in different ways, and to cross-examine on all
specifics before you commit the asylum story to paper. Otherwise
bogus credibility problems may arise later which you could have
avoided. Unless the client is absolutely certain of a date (and if so,
find out why), avoid using exact calendar dates in the statement.
Approximate (e.g., "in early March"), or use "landmark dating,"
(some historic event). About how many days or weeks before or
after? The client may have a pretty good idea of the day of the week
from church schedules and the time of year from the school year
schedule (e.g., "Grand vekans" begins every summer and goes to
about October).
0. Beatings or Torture
If someone was beaten by an authority, describe the beating.
About how many hits? To what part of the body (face, eyes,
stomach, etc.)? Beaten with what? A club ("baton")? How big was
it? Were you given a kalot (a hard, open-palmed smack to the head
or ears)? How many people were beating you? Did you recognize
them? What were their names or nicknames, if you know? Did they
have reputations for brutality? Why, what had they done? Were they
in uniform? What kind of uniform? Did they have weapons? What
kind, if you know? Did they say why they were beating you? Did
they say anything at all before they started beating you? While they
were beating you? Afterwards? Did they call you any names? Did
you fight back? Why not? Did they make you bleed? From what
part of your body? For about how long did they beat you? How
long did it seem? Did they knock you down? Did they threaten you?
Taunt you? How did the beating end?
Were you tortured? How? Were you put in the djak position
(made to squat, with wrists tied around knees and stick placed
cross-wise between elbows and knees, making the victim helpless,
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like a ball, easy to beat)? How did the djak or other torture
session(s) end? Did you have to go to the hospital as a result of your
imprisonment, beatings, or torture? Where? When? For how long?
Who treated you? How exactly? If you did not go to the hospital,
or after your release, did someone else take care of you? Who?
Where? For how long? How exactly? Describe in detail. Was this
while you were in hiding? How did you survive during this period?
Ask about persecution-related scars, fractures, injuries,
perforated ear drums, psychological or mental traumas, nightmares,
past or present impairments, etc. Seek medical evidence to document
them, i.e., an expert affidavit from a doctor confirming that your
client's injuries or trauma, perhaps a fracture viewable by X-ray, are
consistent with the torture, beatings, or prison conditions he or she
suffered. The doctor may be able to assert that the injury is most
likely the result of the torture or other persecuted-related experiences
and not the result of any other trauma. Give the doctor the part of
the story which describes the ill-treatment. 19
P. Hiding
Did you go into hiding? When? Why? In how many
different places? For each hiding place: Where was it? From about
when to when were you there? Why did you hide there? Were you
in the bush ("bois") or countryside ("en dehors")? At someone's
house? Was he or she non-political (less likely to attract attention)?
Where is he or she now (a possible witness)? Who knew where you
were? How did they know? List each person who visited you in
11 See supra note 106.
"'Get references to doctors from Physicians for Human Rights, 100 Boylston Street,
Suite 702, Boston, MA 02116, (617) 695-0041, or from leading asylum attorneys, to
whom the National Immigration Project can refer you. Obtain Medical Testimony on
Victims of Torture: A Physician's Guide to Political Asylum Cases, an excellent manual
available from Physicians for Human Rights. One of its sample medical reports and
affidavits discusses the parrot perch torture position, which is identical or very similar
to the djak. It has sections on qualifying as an expert and on psychological evidence,
among others, and appendices on post-traumatic stress, mood, and depressive disorders.
Attach the doctor's affidavit to the asylum application or, if not yet available, submit it
to the asylum officer before or at the INS asylum interview.
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hiding. For each person, about how many times did he or she visit?
For each time, exactly or about what day and time of day was it?
How long were you in hiding (give approximate dates for
each hiding place)? For each place: Did you always remain indoors
or sometimes go out into the streets? Were there soldiers or Chef
Section aides around who might have seen you? Were they known
for past or present arbitrary arrests or other abuses? Did they suspect
newcomers or strangers? Did you see soldiers or Chef Section aides?
Hear of arrests of newcomers to the area? How did you know these
things? If someone told you, who told you, and what exactly did he
or she say? Did you move about? Sleep in different places or in one
place and eat in another? Where and why? Did you feel safe?
Could you have hid indefinitely? Why not? Could the person hiding
you have supported you indefinitely? What about food? Your lack
of work and income? Did you go into hiding anywhere else?
Where, about when, and why?
Did you at first hope that Aristide would return so that you
could come out of hiding? When did you begin to realize that his
prompt return was unlikely? That you would have to hide
indefinitely? Did you listen to news on the radio? Often? Whose
radio? To what stations (Voice of America, Radio Moscow, others)?
Was listening prohibited? Were you discouraged by news, e.g., that
the military had arrested Aristide supporters or caused them to go
into hiding,12° had killed and wounded hundreds,"' on November 15
'2 See, e.g., Human Rights Violations in Haiti Rival the Duvalier Era: Report,
Agence France Presse, Dec. 9, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
2 Political Killings in Haiti Reported, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1991, at A2. One
human rights report indicated that the Haitian military had killed more than 1500 people
in the first weeks after the coup which overthrew Aristide. Id.
The number now, impossible to ascertain exactly, probably exceeds
5000. The military forces that overthrew Haiti's first freely elected
president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, have consolidated their rule by
ruthlessly suppressing Haiti's once diverse and vibrant civil society.
... The aim is to return Haiti to the atomized and fearful society
of the Duvalier-era.. . . Those behind this systematic repression of
civil society range from the army commander-in-chief, General
Raoul Cedras, who has overseen countless acts of brutality without
making any effort to hold murderers and torturers accountable, to the
rural section chiefs, who wreak havoc in remote hamlets across the
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had ordered French Ambassador and Aristide supporter Rafael
Dufour to leave Haiti, showing its consolidation of power,"' on
December 15 had broadcast on radio and television the names of
about a hundred "activists to be arrested"?" How did you learn
these things? News? Which stations? Friends? Who told you?
When? What exactly did you learn or did they say?
About when did you lose hope and decide you would have to
leave the country? Where were you at the time? Had you ever before
thought or tried to leave? 24 What, if anything, finally happened or
did you learn that made you decide to flee? How did you find a
boat? Through whom? Did you intend to come to the United States,
or preferably simply to find any place of security which would take
you in? Did you think (especially for those who left from the south
of Haiti, e.g., from lie a Vache, Cayes, etc.) that your boat would
take you to Cuba? Did you tell the United States Coast Guard, when
it intercepted you, to let you continue on your way because your boat
was headed towards Cuba? Get a map of Haiti. You will find it
useful in understanding your client's story and flight.
country.
Silencing a People: The Destruction of Civil Society in Haiti (Americas Watch, New
York, N.Y.), Feb. 1993, at 1.
", Lee Hockstader, Haiti Orders the Expulsion of Outspoken French Ambassador,
WASH. POST, Nov. 16, 1991, at A24. Haiti's de facto government called the
ambassador of France, Jean-Rafeal Dufour, "undesirable" and demanded his departure
for the "protection of the national sovereignty." Dufour had labeled the Haitian Army
as a group of "cowards" and called the prime minister a "cretin." Id.
" See, e.g., Urgent Action Appeal, Haiti, Fear for Physical Safety (Amnesty
International, New York, N.Y.), Dec. 19, 1993 (listing 96 persons whose names, with
those of 200 popular organizations, were broadcast on Haitian radio as persons and
groups to be "neutralized"); Michael Tarr, Haiti Seeks Aristide 'Terrorists'Before OAS
Talks, Reuters, Nov. 2, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File (Haiti's
military accused 45 Aristide supporters and aides of planning terrorist acts).
124 Hopefully not, unless your client either was granted asylum abroad previously and
returned voluntarily to participate in the democratic renewal or was arrested and
imprisoned upon return without process of law under horrendous conditions. If so,
describe, including if possible a statement that the earlier flight was politically motivated.
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Q. Danger of Remaining in Haiti
What do you think would have happened to you if you had
remained in Haiti? In a sense the claim is a detailed answer to this
question, but also sum it up. Many clients can respond with'
something like, "I would have been arrested, beaten, imprisoned, and
possibly tortured and killed because of my political activities, as I
have described above." Why? Touch on the salient points, e.g:
I was president of KKM, the leading pro-Aristide
neighborhood committee in Marianie, and two of my
closest friends and a close relative had reliably
warned me that three uniformed and armed soldiers
on the day after the coup had come to my house to
arrest me, had beaten my father and arrested my
brother in my place, had joked that when they caught
me Aristide would come to release me, and had
returned to my house looking for me weeks later.
Who might have done these things to you? The Chef Section or his
aides? The military? Ask whether the Chef Section might have
arrested your client and transferred him or her to military custody in
Port-au-Prince.
Remember to show how your client's activities may have
brought him or her to the attention of military or paramilitary
authorities -- a mandateur identified at a polling place by an aide to
a brutal Chef Section reinstated after the coup; a committee president
well-known throughout the community; a signatory of a letter to an
Aristide government official confiscated by the military after the
coup; a man who had preached an arguably anti-military sermon in
a church attended by an informer; etc.
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R. Lack of Economic Motivation
Persecution and poverty may go together, especially in
"kleptocratic" Haiti, whose poor were victimized by paramilitary
forces for decades and overwhelmingly supported Aristide. 2 But the
United States has for years incorrectly assumed that Haitians flee for
economic reasons just to find work. 2' Your client need not disprove
this red herring but should do so if and only if possible.
Many GuantAnamo Haitians were resilient and relatively
well-off. For example, a young activist and neighborhood committee
president may have taught college for the last few years, earning
$200 per month (1000 gourdes); worked for his father, who employed
ten persons in his successful business, and by 1986 was running it;
by 1987 had a motorcycle and earned more in business than in
teaching; in 1990 bought a house for $3000, set up his own business,
built a warehouse on his own land, employed seven men, and earned
more than he had with his father; worked and taught until the coup
and had no economic motive or thought to flee; and fled only because
soldiers tried to arrest him for his political activities.
Ask the following questions: Did you have work or own your
own business? What kind (give details)? What was your position?
What did you earn? Since when? Did you have employees? How
many? Name them. For each, since when were they employed and
how much did you pay them? Did you have a large house? Did you
build it? Buy it? How much did it cost? How many rooms did it
have? How many were large? Did you own or lease land? What
did you grow on the land (list all crops, e.g., plantains, beans, rice)?
What else did you grow? Did you own many animals (e.g., cows,
goats, poultry)? Did the land produce enough to feed your family?
To feed them well? To sell at market? Did you go to Port-au-Prince
(and/or elsewhere) to sell? What? How often? Did you and your
family always have enough to eat? Shoes and clothing? More than
enough? Furniture (describe)? Television, radio, cabinet, tables,
etc.? Did you own a car, motorcycle, jeep (make and year)?
Camionette (bus)? Did you donate to the poor? How often?
' Amy Wilentz, Haiti's Lies, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 13, 1992, at A23.
Pamela Constable, In Departurefrom Pledge, Clinton Says He Will Send Haitians
Back, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 15, 1993, at 1.
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If your client was relatively well off, show this in detail. If
not, these and similar questions may not elicit helpful information.
But, regardless of economic circumstances, if your client's reasons
for fleeing were political, not economic, he or she should disclaim
economic motivation. The client may state, for example, "I owned
some land and animals, could feed my family, had built my own
house in which we lived, love my country, and would never have left
had it not been for the political problems I have described above."
In writing a disclaimer, don't be defensive or apologetic and use your
judgement -- owning two chickens doesn't show much, one way or
the other.
The asylum story takes precedence. You usually shouldn't
start with a description of your client's economic situation unless it
is an essential part of the claim or, perhaps, is extremely strong.
Rather, weave it in. You might, for example, include a separate
section on your client's business activities and income. If accurate,
the disclaimer may come near the end, e.g., "I did not leave for any
economic reason but rather because of the political problems which
I have described above."
S. Danger of Returning to Haiti
What do you think would happen to you if you go back to
Haiti? Your client's story may conclude with something like the
following:
I fled Haiti not for any economic reason but because
of the events and danger to my life which I have
described above. I cannot now return to Haiti. I will
return to Haiti if democracy and the rule of law are
restored, which will require a complete reform of the
military, so that it will be possible for me to return
without having to fear that the military will arrest,
beat, imprison, or perhaps even kill me for my
political activities and sympathies. For these reasons
I respectfully request political asylum in the United
States.
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Haiti's repressive institutions including the military,
paramilitary, and, in rural areas, Chefs Section, remain. This
supports your client's fear of persecution. If your client also believes
that a particular persecutor is still there, for example a Chef Section
who tried to arrest him, so state, explaining why. The repression
makes it hard to get such information, but you may ask, for example:
Do you think the Chef Section is still there? Do you think you would
have heard if he were no longer there? How? In phone calls or from
recent arrivals, letters, or cassette tapes?
T. Church Involvement
Aristide was a liberation theologist. Investigate any church
involvement and related military persecution. 27 Were you active in
,27 The Haitian military has severely repressed churches and persecuted their
members. See, e.g., Silencing a People: The Destruction of Civil Society in Haiti
(Americas Watch, New York, N.Y.), Feb. 1993, at 79:
Priests and lay church aictivists have suffered unprecedented
persecution since the coup. Haiti is 70-80 percent Catholic and the
church is one of the strongest institutions in the country; it has
commanded respect, sometimes grudging, from a long succession of
regimes in Port-au-Prince. The Catholic Church is widely credited
with providing crucial institutional support and moral leadership in
the struggle against the dictatorship of Jean-Claude Duvalier in the
early and mid-1980s. Much of the Haitian church enthusiastically
adopted the 'preferential option for the poor' and began community
organizing and grass-roots development projects alongside its
traditional evangelical and pastoral work . . . . [F]oreign priests
were expelled from the country under the Duvaliers; in 1987 and
1988, armed gunmen tried to assassinate Father Aristide; mass-goers
were massacred at his Church of St. Jean Bosco in September 1988;
and there have been other incidents. But in no other period have
large numbers of priests, Haitian and foreign-born, been arrested;
never before have churches and rectories been illegally searched by
armed soldiers; and never before have gunmen opened fire around
and upon churches with impunity .... Attacks on churches, priests
and lay activists have continued steadily since the coup. The victims
are usually church workers who assist popular organizations, work
with the church's Justice and Peace Commission, support the Ti
Legliz, or favor the return of President Aristide.
See also Haiti, A Human Rights Nightmare (Lawyers Committee for Human Rights,
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church? Which one? Where? Who was its preacher? Was he or she
sympathetic to Aristide? In any way involved with him? Did the
preacher give a sermon even obliquely critical of the military? Did
he remark on the gap between the rich and the poor? Were you a lay
preacher? Did you ever preach such a sermon? Were you part of
the leadership of the church? Did you attend planning meetings of
the leadership for the next day's services? Were you in the choir?
A contributor? Otherwise prominent or active in the church? Did the
military threaten or take any action against your church? Against its
preacher? Against any of its leaders or members? Did any church
members go into hiding? Why and when exactly? Right after the
coup? Were you ever associated in any way with Aristide, as altar
boy, congregant at his St. Jean Bosco church in Port-au-Prince,
present in September 1988 when Macoutes invaded it and killed,
people, etc.? Were you a part of the church movement, Ti Legliz (the
"little church"), 2 ' in which Aristide was the leading figure? How
exactly? Where, when, why? Describe in detail.
U. Political Activities in School
For each year of school, were you involved in any political
activities or groups at school? Were there teacher activists (who, what
subjects did they teach), political or discussion groups, seminars,
meetings? Who were the leaders? How were you involved? Did
you go to meetings? How many? For each meeting: Where was it
held? At school (where exactly)? At someone's house (whose)?
About how many people attended? What was discussed? Did you
speak or ask questions? What exactly did you say? Did you help
organize meetings or activities? How? At whose request? Was the
New York, N.Y.), Sept. 1992, at 34 ("Since the coup, the military has sought to make
an example of the church in order to crush peasant opposition to military control").
",' Ti Legliz is an indigenous Haitian manifestation of liberation theology. Modelled
on the quasi-communistic Christian -base communities of the early apostles, Ti Legliz
committees (or Ti Kominote Legliz (TKLs)) were involved in cooperative development
ventures, prayer sessions, etc. See Silencing a People: The Destruction of Civil Society
in Haiti (Americas Watch, New York, N.Y.), Feb. 1993, at 86-91 (subsection
documenting repression of "Ti Kominote Legliz" groups in nine areas); HuMAN RIGHTS
WATCH WORLD REPORT 1992 255 (1991).
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group secret? Were there informers? Clandestine cells? Did you
make leaflets? How exactly? How many? What did they say? Did
you distribute them? How many times? For each time, where
exactly? Secretly? At night? Alone? What were the dangers of
doing so? Was anyone in the group arrested? Who? Why? Under
what circumstances? Describe. For how long did you do these
things? Participate in the group? What else did the group do? Was
the school part of the church? Of Aristide's St. Jean Bosco complex?
Affiliated with him? Was the school ever attacked by soldiers,
Macoutes, former Macoutes? Were any nuns, teachers, or students,
arrested, beaten, raped, or otherwise abused, in such attacks?
V. Witnesses and Other Proof
Is there anyone on Guantnamo or in the United States who
can confirm, from knowing you at the time in Haiti, that any part of
your story is true? There may be different witnesses for different
parts of the story. For example, is there anyone who can corroborate
that you demonstrated against Duvalier? Worked for PDCH in 1987?
Campaigned for FNCD and were a mandateur? Were president,
delegate, etc. of a neighborhood committee? Is there anyone who can
corroborate the committee's specific activities, e.g., weekly meetings,
decorating the streets, repairing roads? That you met with the
mayor? Wrote and/or signed letters in your official capacity?
Attended a meeting with Aristide? Is there anyone who can
corroborate the Chef Section's reputation for brutality? That Chef
Section aides on October 1st came to arrest you and beat your
mother? That you were imprisoned and hospitalized? Were a
leading pro-Aristide activist? Were in hiding for the reasons you
have stated? That you had no economic motive to flee because you
were prosperous, had much land, had been a teacher for four years,
etc.?
Many Guantdnamo Haitians arrived with, or shortly before or
after, friends or relatives who can corroborate parts of their stories.
Find them and submit their affidavits. Ask questions like those
above. For each part of the story, make a list of all possible
witnesses who are probably in Guant~namo, the United States, or
somewhere other than Haiti. Your client may be reluctant to give
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names. Explain that witnesses can corroborate the story, perhaps by
giving an affidavit, and make the difference in winning asylum, but
that you won't approach them at all unless your client agrees. Stress
that you just want the names, even if your client has no idea where
they are. They may show up later.
After listing the names of all possible witnesses, go back and
ask for addresses and phone numbers. If your client does not know,
ask resettlement agencies and service providers. If you get an
address or phone number, ask your client to bring in the witness, or
call, write, or go out and visit the prospective witness yourself. If
you still strike out, have the person's name announced, with an
appropriate person to call, on Creole radio programs (e.g., on Elsie
Etheart's WLRN program and others in Miami, Brooklyn, Boston,
etc.).
Does your client have the FNCD manda or any letters,
cassette tapes, or other items received from Haiti after his or her
departure? Any mention of problems is helpful (e.g., a letter or tape
warning your client not to return because "they are still after you,"
that soldiers came to his or her house, that a family member has been
killed). Ask to see all letters, tapes, etc., even if the client thinks
they are irrelevant, so you can review them with your interpreter.
Make sure they are authentic. Get certified translations of helpful
ones.
Copy the original letter or document and the certified
translation. Certify on each copy that it is a true and correct copy of
its original. Submit these certified copies as attachments to the
asylum application or, if the document is obtained later, to the asylum
officer at the interview. Keep the originals to show the officer at the
interview.
Your client, or a family member or friend, may have received
phone calls from Haiti or elsewhere which may have contained a
warning or other important information. Have you, or a family
member or friend, spoken with anyone in Haiti since you arrived
here? With whom? How many times? For each call: Who called
whom? Did you talk? Were you (or the recipient of the call) warned
or given information? Did the person say anything about what had
happened to you? To your village, family, friends? What exactly
did the person say or tell you? Has anyone else received information
which relates to your story, town, family, or friends? What
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information? Try to get affidavits from persons who received
relevant phone calls or other information.
Has anyone from the United States visited your home or town
in Haiti? Has anyone learned that you would be in danger if you
returned and, if so, why? What exactly were they told or did they
learn? By or from whom? For example, someone may have visited
your client's home to check on his wife and children and been
warned by his frightened wife to "get away and tell Jean Robert not
to return because the soldiers returned twice recently looking for
him." Such visits are rare given the current high level of repression.
W. A General Note
Successful claims may be based on one or more incidents.
The purpose of the foregoing questions, and of the categories in
which they are grouped, is to elicit information and facilitate your
interview. You must be familiar with recent Haitian history before
you question your client; with that familiarity, the questions show the
kind of specificity you seek. As an advocate, however, you won't
automatically use all of your client's answers when you write the
application, which should be as strong and favorable as possible.
Clearly describe your client's political activities and opinions.
But remember that Haitians need not have been politically active, in
any traditional sense, to have been politically persecuted. If the
military burned down your client's house because she displayed an
Aristide photo, or because she resided in a poor area which was an
Aristide stronghold, her possible illiteracy is irrelevant. The military
has repressed neighborhood committees and persecuted their
members, correctly perceiving them to be pro-Aristide,
pro-democratic institutions. A speaker in church, an artist, an actor
in a play obliquely critical of the authorities, a person abused by the
military in any way, the wife or younger brother of a man sought by
the military, a housewife, all may be political in the context of Haiti's
current repression.
Be thorough. Insist on quality control, establish trust, use an
excellent interpreter, insist on exact and phrase-by-phrase
interpretation, take the necessary time, ask specific questions, be
patient, write a draft, reinterview, cross-examine, and recheck your
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facts many times. It is hard and rewarding work. But with good
work your client can win.
IV. Interview Principles and Techniques
A. Reprise of the Basic Pinciple: Respect
INS may deny many claims due to shoddy work, not the
merits. Your goal is to win. Do justice to the claim. Winning
requires completeness and accuracy, taking the time to do it right, not
cutting corners. Anything less will lose. Your duty is to the Haitian,
no one else. Reject assembly line thinking. If it takes ten days to do
a case properly, take ten days. You may win. If you rush, your
client will not trust you or the interpreter, interpreting will be faulty,
and you will omit events and get facts wrong, weakening the claim
and your client's credibility. You must know the facts of recent
Haitian history and be an investigator, asking many very specific
questions.
Respect your client. He or she is in culture shock, poor,
non-English speaking, perhaps unemployed and poorly educated, and
most likely ignorant of this country and its legal processes. Survival
in Haiti means not discussing politics with strangers. Now you and
the interpreter -- who if Haitian is doubly suspect -- are asking
intimate political questions! You cannot expect your client to open
up immediately. He or she may not do so for hours or until your
third or fourth interview.
You and the interpreter must cultivate your client's trust.
This is something active, requiring patience, love, and skill at all
times. Spend part or all of your first session getting to know each
other, just shooting the breeze with some coffee and donuts,
explaining some things and perhaps filling out simple biographic
information. The time is well spent.
Plan at least two lengthy interviewing sessions; you may not
begin to get the nitty gritty until the second or third. You may need
twenty sessions, six, or three. The number of sessions depends on
your client's personality, relationship with you and the interpreter,
and the nature of the claim. This is a serious commitment. Make up
your mind to take however long it takes to do it right, just as you
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would if your client were paying you. No one said this would be
easy. Avoid telephone interviews, which lead to errors and
omissions, even if your client lives far away. Inconveniences
notwithstanding, interviews should be in person. Help or get
someone to help with expenses. Get a church or synagogue to adopt
your client.
You may lose patience. You have other work. The client
may be tired, hungry, preoccupied, and slow. He or she is unused
to interviews, cross-examination, and talking through an interpreter,
who may be part of the problem. But this human being risked
everything at sea and is fighting for his or her life. Use your
judgment -- take breaks when an interview becomes unproductive,
reinterview on another day, but leave no stone unturned, persist, do
justice to the claim.
You may exasperate the client by asking so many questions,
by investigating, cross-examining, triple-checking, taking pains. But
you must -- anything less is sloppy, disrespectful, and damning to the
claim. Never sacrifice quality.
B. Repeat, Probe, Focus, Mix-up, Cross-Examine
You must often repeat a question in different ways. Your
client may nod "yes" without understanding or be unresponsive or
vague. Interpreters misunderstand and misinterpret. Probe and
follow-up to confirm. For example, "They came to arrest me"
contains volumes. Who came to arrest you? At your house? In the
street? Did you know their names? Their faces? Had they
committed past abuses? What exactly and when? Were they in
uniform? Armed? How many of them were there? What date or
day did they come? At about what time? Did they knock on the
door? Did someone appear to be in charge? Who was home? Were
you home? What exactly did they say? Do? Did they beat anyone?
With what (clubs, weapons, fists, open palms)? Why? Did they
make threats? How and what exactly? To whom? How did the
ordeal end? Did they return? When? What did you do? What did
your father do (or whoever was home)? Did anyone warn you?
Who? Where? When? Did anyone else warn you?
Key events -- e.g., political activities, arrests, threats,
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beatings, imprisonment, torture, warnings -- require the closest
examination or focus. Give them reality and coherence. Officers and
judges cross-examine; they must believe that your client was
politically active, that soldiers came to arrest him, that he was
warned, that he was reliably warned. Get details and pin them down
before preparing the asylum story. Relive important events, look at
them through a microscope. Make them vivid, make them breathe.
Do not take assertions at face value. Triple-check facts,
numbers, specifics. Mix things up. If your client identifies a
committee's president as Joseph Maxy and its vice-president as Sonia
Gilbert, switch the names around: "So you said Sonia Gilbert was
president?" Your client should correct you. Uncover errors and
imprecisions by asking hard questions now rather than flunking them
at the interview. Mixing up things tests credibility, alertness, and
memory, enlivens the interview, exposes exaggerations, and teaches
the need to approximate things like dates, times of day, and
distances.
Experience and hindsight teach invaluable lessons.
Practitioners are amazed at how often clients seem to change or add
to their stories before the officer or judge. Often the fault is
inadequate interview technique by failing to win trust, take time,
probe, focus, repeat, cross-examine, and pin down. Without exact
and phrase-by-phrase interpretation you will lose much of the story.
Errors also result if interpreters are tired, unfamiliar with a term, or
mix up he and she, for which Creole has only one word. You must
be patient, thorough, and ask lots of specific follow-up questions.
C. Be Inexact Where Appropriate
Officers and judges, months or years after you submit the
application, note the discrepancies between it and your client's live
testimony and deny asylum based on omissions and inconsistencies
between the two, often on minor points. Minimize such needless but
potentially damning errors by investigating, focusing,
cross-examining, and repeating.
Be inexact where the client is unavoidably inexact. For
example, most Haitian applicants do not wear watches, keep precise
track of dates, or measure distances well. Therefore, unless your
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client is one hundred percent sure, write "in the late afternoon"
instead of an exact time; "a few" instead of "two" days later; "a solid
day's walk" or "perhaps ten kilometers or so" instead of "ten
kilometers.". "About" and "approximately" are essential words, "Are
you sure?" an essential question. Your client says that "four"
soldiers came to arrest him. "Are you sure there were four, not three
or five?" Or that "sixty people" would attend meetings. "Was it
sometimes less? More? Was there a range?"
D. Be Demonstrative and Vivid
Soldiers stomped on your client's left leg, rebreaking it, while
he was lying on the floor on his right side in the djak torture
position. Ask him to demonstrate. If he is reluctant or slow, get on
the floor on your right side in the djak position to check with him if
that is how it was, or have someone else do so. Do not hesitate out
of decorum or shyness.
Your client was imprisoned; to investigate conditions and
possible overcrowding, you want to know the size of the cell.
Indicating and getting up, ask your client if the cell measured "from
about here to here." When he or she indicates the right distances,
slowly pace them off in both directions, one foot after the other, to
get approximate measurements for the cell.
Were the soldiers angry or furious when they came to arrest
your brother? Demonstrate both attitudes with your face and voice.
Such demonstrations, with your client's input, give you a better idea
of the facts. They also may reinvigorate the interview and improve
the quality of participation by client and interpreter.
Be vivid in your descriptions, for example of beatings,
torture, corpses, blood. Describe gore, rape, outrage explicitly,
factually, and in detail; true descriptions tell. Don't shy away.
These things happened, and you are being faithful to the facts, not
perverse. But be precise, and tell the client never to exaggerate
anything, or he or she loses. The truth suffices.
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E. Be an Advocate: Don't be Defensive or Apologetic
Good questions uncover the story, but you need not use all of
your client's answers. Be an advocate: Write affirmatively, not
defensively or apologetically, so that the story reads as strongly and
favorably as possible. Avoid rhetoric, be factual. Use your
judgment, and be positive: "Although I wasn't a leading speaker"
and "Although I wasn't rich" are lame; state what your client was or
did. Don't make excuses; if a neighborhood committee was of minor
importance, state its achievements without belittling it. Always be
truthful, but do not exercise false modesty.
Rarely an issue may arise concerning the disqualification of
persons who participated in the persecution of others. For example,
once two members of your client's neighborhood committee --
without your client's help, urging, or acquiescence or that of the
committee -- murdered a former Macoute. Unless otherwise relevant,
why raise the red herring of persecution of others? A judge may
create something out of nothing and deny asylum. You probably
won't encounter the issue; I haven't encountered the example just
described.
F. Internal Consistency
Clients often misremember dates. One way to find out when
something happened is to ask "about how many days after that" it
occurred. You may do this often. But usually approximate the
number of days, and make sure they add up. If your client hid in
three places between November 1 and December 1, supposedly for
about fifteen, five, and twenty days respectively, there's a problem:
November has thirty days, not forty. Also, clients often confuse
before and after, so make sure the sequence of events is correct.
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G. Completing the Asylum Forms and Reading Back
There are three forms -- the request for asylum (1-589), the
biographic information form (G-325A), and the request for
employment authorization (1-765). Credibility problems can arise
from errors and omissions in biographic information, so do this work
yourself to insure that you get all the information. Do it on a
separate day, so that the client is fresh when you begin asylum
interviewing. Alternatively, a properly trained intake worker may
complete the 1-765 and drafts for your review of the G-325A and of
the biographic parts of the 1-589, which are mostly on pages one and
four of the most recent version of the form.
Then start your hours of interviewing, writing a draft, getting
it critiqued by an attorney experienced in Haitian asylum work,
reinterviewing, redrafting, having the second draft critiqued,
reinterviewing and redrafting again, as often as necessary. The final,
perfected, approved draft is the addendum, a full chronological
account of your client's asylum story, structured throughout with
appropriate headings; for example, "My Activities in 1987 With
Sylvio Claude." Triple- or double-space it.
Have the interpreter, in your presence, slowly read the story
back to the client to check for accuracy and completeness. Welcome
additions and corrections, and instruct the client to immediately
interrupt to make them, as often as necessary, no matter how trivial
or unimportant they may seem. Sensitize your interpreter and the
client. If the story contains errors or omissions, you want to correct
the story now, since later an officer or judge may deny asylum based
on perceived discrepancies between it and the client's live testimony.
Make sure your client is attentive at all times. There's no
room for shyness or tiredness. If the client does not immediately
interrupt to correct an error, he or she will not remember it later, and
it will go uncorrected. Take a break or reschedule if necessary. Tell
the client that making any changes is easy, since you have a word
processor, and that neither you nor the interpreter minds making
them, since the story is the client's, not yours or the
interpreter's. Like interviewing in general, you cannot rush, and the
client must sense that you and the interpreter genuinely welcome
corrections. Both of you must be patient and reassuring. There is
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an understandable tendency to rush the reading back, because you and
the interpreter have already spent considerable time getting the
information and preparing the story. But a quick reading won't elicit
the corrections; you will be rushing to denial. If you feel one
hundred percent sure that your client "told you all of this," catch
yourself -- nothing is sure, details count, your client may correct or
remember something important. Read the story back slowly. Insist
that your client interrupt immediately and as often as necessary. Do
not read back or interview on the phone, a sure recipe for error.
Make sure all forms and documents are consistent internally
and with each other. Review and revise the drafts of the G-325A and
the biographic parts of the 1-589. Mistakes on the G-325A can be
damning, for example regarding the applicant's residence for the last
five years. If it shows your client residing at home until December
while the addendum has him or her going into hiding in early
October, the officer or judge may question credibility. It has
happened. Although the form asks for "residence," avoid possible
problems by listing all places and months of hiding, e.g., "hiding in
St. Jean, La Gonave, Haiti, November 1991 to December 1991,
hiding in the woods outside Jeremie, October 1991 to November
1991." Instruct your properly trained intake worker accordingly.
Always recheck everything on the G-325A and the biographic
information in the 1-589 against the completed and read back asylum
story.
Then and only then complete the asylum-related questions on
the 1-589. If you can comfortably fit answers into the spaces
provided, fine; if not, write "see attachments" and append a few
attachment sheets on which you answer them. Write at the left
margin of each, "Addendum to 1-589 of ROOSEVELT, Theodore"
and, on the line below, your client's immigration "A" number,
"A71 000 -- continuation of answers." The attachment sheets go in
front of the full asylum story.
Answer each question fully, summing up the main points and
beginning or ending with, "See my attached story and other answers
herein." Check all appropriate boxes, yes or no. Haitian asylum
claims are usually based at least on "political opinion" and
"membership in a particular social group." In response to question
thirty-two on the new asylum form, you should assert, if true, that
your client has not caused, ordered, or assisted in the persecution of
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others.
The answer to the 1-589's last question, which asks for any
additional information, changes as human rights reports appear and
evidence develops on repression and the persecution of returnees in
Haiti. But you may answer approximately as follows, varying the
answer with the facts of the case, omitting for example references to
literacy programs and the 1987 election if your client had nothing to
do with either:
See my attached story, the latest Master Exhibit,
and/or the latest reports (preferably name, cite to, and
attach pages from specific reports,- e.g., Silencing a
People: The Destruction of Civil Society in Haiti,
Americas Watch, February 1993, at 79-93, attached)
of Amnesty International, Americas Watch, the
Lawyers Committee for International Human Rights,
the Committee to Protect Journalists, the National
Coalition for Haitian Refugees, Caribbean Rights,
Physicians for Human Rights, and other groups on
Haitian political conditions, including the 1987 and
December 1990 elections; the military's September
30, 1991 ouster of President Aristide; its post-coup
repression of the Lavalas movement, the FNCD,
peasant organizations, rural development projects and
groups; neighborhood committees and other
community and popular organizations, women's,
youth, and literacy groups, trade unions, students and
educators, the Catholic Church and clergy and lay
teachers, local and national Aristide government
officials and communal police agents, the press, and
of persons who possessed or distributed pro-Aristide
materials or posted Aristide leaflets or slogans on
,their homes or elsewhere; its reinstatement of section
chiefs throughout rural Haiti; the lack of any rule of
law in Haiti; prison conditions; the persecution of
returnees, etc. The military has killed at least 5000
persons since the coup, causing thousands of grass-
roots activists and Aristide supporters to flee or hide.
The reports document extrajudicial executions,
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torture, and hellish conditions of imprisonment; the
repression of peaceful student protests and of priests
and nuns; the prohibition of any meetings; and the
military's internal radio communications, discipline,
and organized ability and instructions to repress
nationwide any sign of pro-Aristide support or
sympathy.
If and only if the evidence is strong, a final paragraph to this answer
may reassert your client's lack of economic motivation for fleeing:
I wish to add that I did not leave Haiti for any
economic reason; I was quite prosperous as a
businessman and teacher, love my country, and would
not have left had it not been for the events which I
have described above. See my attached story at pages
After you have rechecked the G-325A and completed the 1-589,
slowly read back to your client everything in both forms and on all
attachment sheets to check for mistakes, additions, and clarifications.
Common law spouses must file separate applications, but on
each you may ask for joinder with and attach all or most of the
common law spouse's application. Make sure that the claims are
consistent with each other and that each is as fully developed as
possible.
Check with the head of INS' local Asylum Unit on proper
filing procedures, including the number of copies of each form INS
desires, stressing that this is a GuantAnamo case. The work
authorization form (1-765), although filed at the same time, is not part
of the asylum application. If possible file in person, always getting
your copies stamped. If by mail, send the documents by certified
mail, return receipt requested. Ask what you can do to expedite
processing of the 1-765, since work authorization is so important.
Contact the National Immigration Project for the latest information on
getting INS to grant extensions of the periods of your client's parole
(and the 1-589 due date) and work authorization.
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H. Give Your Client a Cassette Tape of the Story
Preferably when you file, have your interpreter make a
cassette tape in Creole of the asylum story, with a short introduction
explaining its purpose, and give it to your client. Make it soon,
while the story is fresh in your interpreter's mind, so that the client
has plenty of time to listen to it. The tape must be an exact and full
translation of the story. Listening to the tape is much better for your
client than simply to have a copy of the 1-589, which is attended by
embarrassing language and literacy problems, and is excellent
preparation for the upcoming INS interview. The tape should include
the asylum story, the 1-589's asylum-related questions and answers,
and the G-325A's list of hiding places and dates, which may arise at
the interview. Keep an extra file copy of the tape in case your client
loses the first one.
L Corroborative, Documentary, and Expert Evidence
On witnesses, letters, cassette tapes, phone calls, and visits,
check that your submissions are consistent internally and with each
other. Translations of letters should be certified by a competent
interpreter. Submit affidavits and certified copies of original
documents, including of translations. If possible corroborate the
various parts of your client's story, for example with affidavits from
any available witnesses.
J. Study the Human Rights Reports
Human rights reports put the claim in context. Look for
examples of the persecution of persons similarly situated to your
client, relevant background information, and evidence on the
persecution of returnees. Reports are published by Americas Watch
and the National Coalition for Haitian Refugees (NCHR), Amnesty
International (AI), the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights
(LCHR), the Committee to Protect Journalists, the American
Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA), Physicians for Human
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Rights, Caribbean Rights, and other groups. 9 Look for evidence on
the persecution of returnees, including affidavits from
"double-backers" to Guantnamo and radio, television, press, and
rights reports by persons who have visited repatriated persons and
others in hiding. Check with the Documentation Exchange and
leading practitioners on the latest such evidence.13 0
I" See supra notes 112, 113, 115-17, 121, and 127, listing recent reports. Recent
reports include Silencing a People: The Destruction of Civil Society in Haiti (Americas
Watch, New York, N.Y.), Feb. 1993; Haiti, A Human Rights Nightmare (Lawyers
Committee for Human Rights, New York, N.Y.), Sept. 1992; Haiti, Human Rights Held
Ransom (Amnesty International, New York, N.Y.), Aug. 1992. The Lawyers
Committee for Human Rights published Paper Laws, Steel Bayonets, documenting the
lack of an independent judiciary or rule of law, and it, like Amnesty International and
other groups, publishes smaller periodic reports on human rights violations in Haiti. The
Committee to Protect Journalists publishes excellent reports documenting repression of
Haiti's radio stations and other media; Caribbean Rights wrote a report on the 1990
election; Physicians for Human rights wrote a report on Haiti's hellish prison conditions
and has co-authored other Haiti reports. The National Coalition for Haitian Refugees
publishes, usually every other month, Haiti Insight, which lists monthly rights violations.
Complete sets of this documentation, including Church World Service's essential and
regularly updated Index to Documentation Supporting Haitian Asylum Claims, is
available from the Documentation Exchange, PO Box 2327, Austin, Tex. 78768 (512)
476-9841, fax (512) 476-0130, attention Charlotte McCann. The Documentation
Exchange is also distributing "theme packets" on Haiti which are another essential tool
for the practitioner. The theme packets, organized by subjects (e.g. repression of
neighborhood committees or other popular organizations, persecution of persons for
posting Aristide leaflets, etc.), document particular types of repression and persecution
by citing to specific human rights reports, articles, etc. Addresses for some groups are
as follows: Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, 330 7th Ave., 10th Floor, New
York, NY 10001, (212) 629-6170; Americas Watch, a division of Human Rights Watch,
485 Fifth Ave., 3rd Floor, New York, NY 10017, (212) 972-8400; Amnesty
International Refugee Office, 655 Sutter St., Suite 402, San Francisco, CA 94102, (415)
776-2473; Committee to Protect Journalists, 330 7th Ave., 12th Floor, New York, NY
10001, (212) 465-1004, fax (212) 465-9568; Anne Fuller at NCHR: (212) 867-0020, 16
East 42nd St., 3rd Floor, New York, NY 10017; Physicians for Human Rights, 100
Boylston St., Suite 702, Boston, MA 02116, (617) 695-0041; Caribbean Rights, No. 5
3rd Ave., Bellville, St. Michael, Barbados, (809) 436-9456; Minnesota Lawyers
International Human Rights Committee, 400 2nd Ave. So., Suite 1050, Minneapolis,
MN 55401, (612) 341-3302.
30 See supra note 129.
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K. Quote Specific Pages of Rights Reports to Prove Every Point
Nothing is self-evident to the asylum officer, who will
challenge your assumptions. Assume nothing, prove everything. For
example, your client was president of a neighborhood committee. Do
not assume that the officer knows that such committees were
grassroots political organizations. Prove it by citing and presenting
specific evidence on the point.
Break down the claim into each of its elements. Prove each
element by submitting relevant human rights reports, articles, and
other materials and by referring to and quoting from specific pages
of them. If contained in an officially-accepted master exhibit in use
by the asylum officer, cite the specific reports or other materials and
quote and submit copies of specific pages from them. Quote and
submit such copies even if a master exhibit is in use.
L. Submit a "Summary of Key Points" Before or at the Interview
Examine your assumptions, make them explicit, and prove
them. Know the human rights reports intimately. Do not just
provide them to the officer or refer to a master exhibit which contains
them; cite and quote specific sentences and paragraphs. Prepare a
Summary of Key Points. Assert and support each point, e.g., that
the military or rural section chiefs persecuted persons who, like your
client, criticized government officials on the radio, engaged in
neighborhood organizing, or were FNCD mandateurs, that section
chiefs like the one who tried to arrest your client were brutal and
corrupt, that the section chief in your case had a history of brutality.
Quote your corroborative and expert affidavits and documents.
Append and analogize to case law. For example, if the claim
involves a neighborhood committee, append and incorporate into your
argument each reference in the reports to their political or democratic
nature, activities, and affiliations, and anything on the military's
distrust, infiltration, and post-coup repression of them and their
members. If it involves a section chief, cite references to their
repression, specific human rights violations, replacement by Aristide,
and post-coup reinstatement. Refer to and quote from your expert
affidavits. Submit the Summary of Key Points before or at the
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asylum interview. It may impress the officer and win the case.
Preparing it is easy if you have gathered your evidence, studied the
reports, and looked at relevant case law.
M. Expert Affidavits
Submit an expert affidavit whenever possible."' Give the
expert a copy of the 1-589, G-325A, and any corroborative proof.
Seek affidavits from more than one expert.
An affidavit usually states the expert's qualifications, that the
expert has reviewed the application, and relevant background facts on
Haiti, some of which will vary from case to case, as in the examples
involving neighborhood committees and section chiefs. The expert
should discuss the claim in the context of Haitian political conditions.
He or she should reach conclusions, e.g., that the claim is
compelling, the applicant's actions were political, the persecution
suffered was politically motivated, others similarly situated have been
persecuted (giving examples), that the client likely would be
persecuted on account of political opinion if repatriated, etc.' The
affidavit should be sworn before a notary public or end with, "I
hereby declare under penalty of perjury in (city), (state), on (date)
that the foregoing is true and correct." Its paragraphs should be
numbered. In the case of torture, beatings, hospitalization, or other
persecution-related physical or mental injuries or traumas, seek a
doctor's expert evaluation and affidavit.
'3 The persons listed in the appendix have agreed to receive materials and to
consider providing an expert affidavit. All are busy, and some may respond more
readily than others. The list is representative, not exhaustive; undoubtedly there are
others you may find. See infra Appendix C, "List of People to Contact for Expert
Affidavits."
132 An example of an expert affidavit is available from the National Immigration
Project, (617) 227-9727.
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N. Amnesty International Support Letter
Amnesty International's Refugee Office,' with adequate
notice, may be able to provide a letter, in light of its own extensive
reports and analysis, supporting the strength, plausibility, and
political context of your client's claim. Your client need not be
prominent, but the claim should be strong. Preparation of the letter
may take time, so send a copy of the 1-589, G-325A, and any other
evidence, and information on the status of the case, as soon as
possible. The Refugee Office also provides information on country
conditions and, if available, on specific conditions, and in a
compelling case may thoroughly research their files.
0. Critiques of State Department Country Reports
The Lawyers Committee for Human Rights (LCHR) publishes
critiques of the annual State Department Country Reports on Haiti.
The State Department reports may contain useful information, but
often contain distortions which an officer (or later the judge in
exclusion proceedings) may use against your client. Be familiar with
them and with LCHR's critiques, and be prepared to introduce the
latter in rebuttal if necessary. If tempted to use a State Department
report, read it to check for any harmful statements and seek the
advice of an experienced practitioner. To some extent the decision
depends on the particular facts and strength of the claim. If the
report contains harmful statements, you may be putting your client at
risk unnecessarily by assuming that the officer and judge will ignore
them, which they may not.
P. Know the Law
INS may not neglect the generous provisions of the 1980
Refugee Act."3 4 You should be familiar with the landmark case, INS
... Amnesty International Refugee Office, 655 Sutter Street, Suite 402, San
Francisco, CA 94102, (415) 776-2473.
I% Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980).
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v. Cardoza-Fonseca,1  with the BIA's interpretation of it, Matter of
Mogharrabi, 36 and with more recent decisions by the BIA, in your
jurisdiction, and in others.
An applicant need not show that he or she was singled out for
persecution, merely that others similarly situated were. It suffices if
a reasonable person would have feared or would fear persecution.
These principles inform your study of the rights reports; bring to the
officer's attention every example of persecution of persons situated
similarly to your client. Be familiar with the theory of imputed
political opinion.' 37 The Supreme Court's decision in INS v.
Elias-Zacarias 38 did not eliminate this and similar theories 39 but.
strongly underscores the need for well-developed facts, which is the
thrust of this paper.
Clearly and explicitly state your client's political opinions and
motivations, if any, and the evidence supporting the imputation or
attribution of such opinions and motivations to your client by the
military, the Chef Section, or the government. For example, your
client was apolitical but lived in a pro-Aristide section of town, the
houses of which, including your client's, were burned down after the
coup by the military, or by the Chef Section. Bring out that the
houses all had Aristide photos on them (including one on your client's
house put up by a neighbor with or without her consent); that huge
Aristide rallies had been held in the section, which voted one hundred
percent for him; that there were Lavalas groups there; that "the
soldiers came by in jeeps an hour before they set fire to our houses
'3"480 U.S. 421,449(1987) ("to show a 'well-founded fear of persecution,' an alien
need not prove that it is more likely than not that he or she will be persecuted in his or
her home country.").
1987 BIA LEXIS 5, at *15 (B. of Immigration App. June 12, 1987) (an applicant
for asylum has established the required well-founded fear of persecution if a reasonable
person in his or her circumstances would fear persecution).
' The theory of imputed political opinion reflects the notion that one is persecuted
not because of one's overt expression, but because of particular acts or circumstances
committed which leads to certain opinions being attributed to that person. See Desir v.
llchert, 840 F.2d 723, 728 (9th Cir. 1988).
' 112 S. Ct. 812 (1992).
The Supreme Court stated in Elias-Zacarias that a person seeking "reversal of the
[Board of Immigration Appeals] determination ...must show that the evidence he
presented was so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find the requisite
fear of persecution." Id. at 817.
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shouting that we were all Aristide supporters;" that the Chef Section
or local military chiefs or soldiers disliked your client, etc. Show if
possible what the military or Chef Section did to others who they
thought or said were Aristide partisans.
Desir v. llchert,1 4° discusses imputed political opinion in the
context of Haitian cases.1 41 Note that persecution need not be by the
government, if it is by a group or groups which the government is
unwilling or unable to control. 142 Note also that an asylum grant may
be based on your client's credible testimony, even if
uncorroborated. 141
The practitioner should be familiar with and cite an important
recent INS memorandum, the March 9, 1993 Memorandum from
John W. Cummings, Acting Director of INS' Office of International
Affairs.'44 The "Cummings Memo" addresses several controversial
140 840 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1988). Although the Board of Immigration Appeals has
attempted to limit Desir's applicability to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the INS
General Counsel's January 19, 1993 memorandum on imputed political opinion cites it
affirmatively. See also Memorandum from John Cummings, Acting Director, Office of
International Affairs to Asylum Division and Refugee Division of the INS 4 (Mar. 9,
1993) ("Violence may occur for reasons of envy, ambition, greed, or sheer desperation
.... These acts, in and of themselves, are not usually grounds for refugee protection.
However, if they are conducted by section chiefs, their subordinates, or other
governmental or quasi-governmental officials, and/or if they are coupled with other acts
related to a protected ground, they may form part of a pattern or practice which may rise
to the level of persecution.") (emphasis added) (on file with the New York Law School
Journal of Human Rights; also available from the Documentation Exchange, PO Box
2327, Austin, Tex. 78768 (512) 476-9841, fax (512) 476-0130, attention Charlotte
McCann).
141 See supra note 140.
142 See McMullen v. INS, 658 F.2d 1312, 1315 (9th Cir. 1981) (persecution by non-
governmental groups, i.e. the Provisional Irish Republican Army, is covered by the
Refugee Act of 1980).
14 See Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Deportation, 8 C.F.R. §
208.13(a) (1992) ("The burden of proof is on the applicant for asylum to establish that
he is a refugee . . . . The testimony of the applicant, if credible in light of general
conditions in the applicant's country of nationality or last habitual residence, may be
sufficient to sustain the burden of proof without corroboration.").
'1 Memorandum from John W. Cummings, Acting Director, Office of International
Affairs of the INS to Asylum Division and Refugee Division (Mar. 9, 1993) (on file with
the New York Law School Journal of Human Rights; also available from the
Documentation Exchange, P0 Box 2327, Austin, Tex. 78768 (512) 476-9841, fax (512)
476-0130, attention Charlotte McCann).
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"red herrings" frequently and improperly used by Asylum Officers to
deny Haitian asylum claims, including the issues of "prominence,"
"internal flight," and so-called "personal" acts of violence or
repression.
The State Department, in its 1991 report on Haiti, vastly and
erroneously understated the military's brutal post-coup repression at
the grass-roots level throughout Haiti of all suspected pro-Aristide
sympathizers. This report was contradicted by the reports of every
independent human rights monitoring group, which documented the
extensive repression. The Cummings Memorandum, in a tribute to
the accuracy of the independent reports, notes that the "wide
divergences" between these two positions has "greatly diminished"
since publication of the State Department's 1992 report. 45 The
memorandum also sets forth several of the categories of persons at
risk such as Aristide supporters, members of popular organizations
and trade unions, students, journalists, and religious workers."4
The Cummings Memorandum, in contrast to the 1991 State
Department report, de-emphasizes the importance of "prominence"
in assessing the risk of persecution. Asylum officers, relying on the
State Department report, have frequently denied asylum because the
applicant was not a "prominent" Aristide supporter. The
Memorandum states that "lack of prominence does not remove the
possibility of being at risk. This is true especially considering the
fact that Haitian society is organized into small communities.
Activities, either real or imputed, are a far more important
consideration in assessing risk, than is prominence."' 47
Asylum Officers also have frequently denied asylum on the
presumption that an applicant fled or could have fled into hiding
somewhere else within Haiti. The Cummings Memorandum debunks
this presumption of internal flight as a remedy to persecution:
Officers must not make assumptions about the
viability of internal flight within Haiti. . ... [I]f-the
applicant is determined to have established a well-
founded fear of persecution in one location in Haiti,
14 Id. at 2.
'4' Id.: at 5-7.
"7 Id. at 7.
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it is generally correct, under present conditions, to
find that the threat of persecution exists countryside.
This is true notwithstanding the fact that sympathetic
countrymen may be successful in hiding the applicant
from a reportedly wide network of civilian informants
employed by the military.148
The Cummings Memorandum is also helpful on the issue of
"imputed political opinion." Asylum adjudicators for years have
denied asylum by erroneously characterizing a victim's persecution
by kleptocratic and arbitrary Haitian authorities as "personal" or
"economically motivated," ignoring the political context of their
abuses. Practitioners now may cite the following:
Violence may occur for reasons of envy, ambition,
greed, or sheer desperation. . . . These acts, in and
of themselves, are not usually grounds for refugee
protection. However, if they are conducted by section
chiefs, their subordinates, or other governmental or
quasi-governmental officials, and/or if they are
coupled with other acts related to a protected ground,
they may form part of a pattern or practice which
may rise to the level of persecution. 14
9
In preparing claims, accompanying your client to an asylum
interview, writing a rebuttal to an INS Asylum Officer's Notice of
Intent to Deny, or accompanying your client to court, be familiar
with and cite the standards set forth in the Cummings Memorandum,
as outlined above. Many Notices of Intent to Deny, for example,
predate the Cummings Memorandum, which sought to address some
of their frequent errors, e.g., on the "prominence," "internal flight,"
and "personal persecution" issues. Use the Cummings Memorandum
to rebut them! If you have already filed your rebuttal, file a
supplementary rebuttal citing the Memorandum. If INS has issued a
' Id.
I' id. at 4 (emphasis added). See also Silencing a People, The Destruction of Civil
Society in Haiti (Americas Watch, New York, N.Y.), Feb. 1993, at 122-24 (discussing
repression of dissenters and supporters of Aristide).
HAITIAN ASYLUM ADVOCACY
final denial of asylum and placed your client in exclusion proceedings
by issuing form 1-122, persuade your Asylum Unit Director to
rescind the 1-1225' and reconsider the denial by showing him or her
that the Asylum Officer issued it in reliance on improper standards.
V. Preparing for the INS Asylum Interview
A. Preparing the Client
You must prepare for the interview as for trial. Interview
your client at least twice before the INS interview, including once
immediately before it. Is she listening to the tape provided to her by
you? Why not? Are there any mistakes in it? Additions to make?
Play the role of a skeptical INS officer: cross-examine, mix-up,
focus, doubt, politely but with no holds barred. Take at least a few
hours; exactly how long depends on the nature of the claim, your
client's personality, and the quality of your interaction. Explain what
you are doing and why, taking breaks as necessary. You might
explain, for example:
An Immigration officer is going to interview you on
your asylum application and will decide whether to
grant or deny it. The officer is supposed to help you
bring out your story but is not your friend and usually
denies asylum, depending on how strong or weak the
claim is. The officer may ask you difficult questions
to see if your story falls apart, including even some
tricky ones ('li ka dsdyd trompe [phonetically
'trompay,' accent on the second syllable] ou'), and
will compare your answers to what is in the
application. You will do okay if you tell the truth,
what really happened. You will have problems if you
lie or exaggerate. When you answer, do not assume
that the officer knows too much about Haiti. He or
she knows something, but probably not a lot.
Imagine the officer as a foreigner, visiting Haiti for
1-o See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. 242.7 (1992) (Cancellation of Proceedings).
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the first time, who needs to understand everything
about your story. Answer slowly, clearly, and fully,
one step at a time. If you do not understand a
question, ask the officer to please repeat it. He or
she will be glad to do so. Take your time; no one is
in a rush. Never answer or nod your head to a
question if you don't understand it! There aren't any
"right" answers except what really happened, so do
not say anything just because you think the officer
wants to hear it! It could be a trap. Always stick to
the truth. Also, if you are sure of an answer, that is
fine, but if not, do not say you are; approximate, use
"about" ("a peu prd" or "ver") when you are. not
sure. Never exaggerate. If asked, "how many
soldiers came to arrest you," say the truth, "one," not
"three." If you make things up, you will lose because
the officer will sense it, your asylum application says
something different, and you will get mixed up or the
officer may trip you up. It is easy to remember what
really happened, almost impossible to remember lies
against someone trained to detect them.
It is essential to prepare your client for a few hours
immediately before the INS interview. Go over everything --
explain, role play, cross-examine, mix-up, and focus -- so that the
asylum story and what to expect are fresh in your client's mind.
B. Letters, Cassette Tapes, etc.
Ask for all letters, cassette tapes, or other materials received
from Haiti and update phone and address information on witnesses,
some of whom may have turned up since your last talk with your
client about them. Get certified translations of documents. Ask
about phone calls from Haiti and information from recent visitors.
Renew your search for witnesses, which you began while preparing
the application. Ask but do not overly rely on help from your client.
Ask the resettlement agencies for help in locating them, and ask
Creole radio programs to announce their names and why you need
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them. Phone, write, and visit prospective witnesses you find to
explain why you need them. Prepare their affidavits, making sure
they are consistent internally, with your client's story, and, if there
are more than one, with each other.
C. Rebutting an Intent to Deny Letter
An INS officer who intends to deny asylum must send a
Notice of Intent to Deny, which your client may rebut within a given
time period. Take advantage of this right. Rebut the intended denial
by providing additional affidavits and argument. A Summary of Key
Points, a supplement to a previously submitted Summary, or a
mini-brief on the law may be appropriate. If the officer or State
Department apparently misunderstood your client's application or
testimony, submit supplemental affidavits from your client and/or
from corroborative witnesses which remove the misunderstanding.
The officer or State Department may have misunderstood background
facts. For example, for years after Duvalier's fall the State
Department incorrectly asserted that the Macoutes had been
"disbanded." Show the true state of facts by submitting human rights
reports -- cite, quote, and append specific pages -- and expert
affidavits.
If the officer thinks that your client's persecution or fear of
persecution is not based on one of the five enumerated grounds in the
statute, cite to the 1980 Refugee Act,"' case law, to our obligations
under the United Nations Convention and Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees, and to the Handbook on the latter's interpretation.
If possible analogize to cases in which Haitian or other applicants in
similar circumstances won asylum. The officer may apply incorrect
legal standards, for example the discarded "singled out for
persecution" standard instead of the "similarly situated" and
"reasonable person" standards. INS may not ignore the 1980
Refugee Act. Show the correct standards. Describe and append
pages from the human rights reports showing the persecution of
persons situated similarly to your client.
"' Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980).
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D. On Filing the Asylum Application Late
INS screened in most GuantAnamo Haitians with parole
documents giving them three to six months to file for asylum, which
it later extended to one year from the person's date of arrival."t 2
Even this is unrealistic, especially in cities like Miami with large
numbers of GuantAnamo entrants and limited legal resources available
to assist them, and your local INS District Director, upon your
request, may grant a further extension of your client's parole, work
authorization, and 1-589 filing period, perhaps of one year, if you can
show that you have made a good faith effort, given the resources at
your disposal, in representing you GuantAnamo client or clients.
Do not rush your asylum work. Rushing leads to
inaccuracies, omissions, and denials. Seek an extension in which to
file. If you are unsuccessful in obtaining an extension and must file
late to avoid rushing, you should probably file late. Filing
completely and accurately, even if late, avoids later credibility
problems. Try not to file an incomplete application and supplement
later. The incomplete part, even in simple references, may contain
mistakes or omissions which you later will have to explain. The
officer, perhaps skeptical that "there was not time," may wonder, "If
what is in the supplement is true, why didn't you put it in the
application in the first place?" If you already have rushed something
in or are taking over from someone who did, or if new information
becomes available, by all means supplement. The INS Asylum Unit
in Miami reportedly will accept late filings, as may other
jurisdictions. But do not assume anything; consult the head of the
asylum unit and leading asylum practitioners in your jurisdiction.
Much better still, you may be able to get your District Director to
extend your client's parole (and 1-589 due date) and work
authorization by issuing new parole and work authorization cards.
If you seek but fail to get such extensions and your client's
work authorization is nearing expiration, filing late understandably
will concern your client. But if the choice is between renewing work
authorization three weeks earlier by filing an inferior application on
152 To check their respective expiration dates, ask to see your client's INS parole and
employment authorization documents, the "1-94" ("ti papyc" or "little paper") and "EAD
card" ("kat permi travay" or "permission to work card").
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the one hand, and going three weeks longer without it but filing a
potentially winning application on the other hand, the choice is clear -
- file the better application and try to win, with all the beneficial
consequences which follow.
If you cannot get an extension of the 1-589's due date and too
many months elapse thereafter without your having filed, INS may
serve Form 1-122, beginning exclusion proceedings, and deem your
client's right to seek asylum affirmatively before the asylum officer
to have been abandoned. Relevant questions are: How soon is INS
in your area likely to begin exclusion proceedings by serving Form
1-122? In Miami, the head of INS's Asylum Unit has said that INS
is unlikely to do so before at least four to six months after the elapsed
due date, but the window period may be less in other jurisdictions.
If you file with the Asylum Unit before the 1-122's issuance, will INS
postpone issuance pending the Asylum Unit's adjudication? These
questions probably need not affect your decision to file within a
reasonable period after the due date and may be moot if you can get
a formal extension of it.
In sum, if you need more time to file completely and
accurately, seek an extension. If unsuccessful in getting one, file
late, after double-checking with the asylum unit and with leading
practitioners in your jurisdiction.
E. Miscellaneous: File a Notice of Appearance,
Update Address and Phone Information,
and File a FOIA Request
You won't receive any notices from INS unless you file a
Notice of Appearance (G-28), the attorney representation form. If
you don't get notice, your client, who may have moved from his or
her address and consequently never received notice either, may be
denied asylum and ordered excluded and deported in absentia.
Constantly update your file with all possible addresses and home and
work phone numbers for your client and for every relative and friend
he or she can think of. Recent arrivals move a lot and do not leave
forwarding addresses, and phones are always getting disconnected.
You can't get too many phone numbers; three or four of them will be
disconnected when you need them. Not updating phone numbers and
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addresses is extremely dangerous when an INS appointment has been
scheduled and you need to reach your client.
Update your list of possible contact persons and of their
phone numbers and addresses each time you or someone from your
office talks to the client in person or by phone. Accompanying
family members, friends, or sponsors, having been here longer than
your client, are excellent sources of such information. Get as many
home and work phone numbers and addresses as you can for as many
relatives and friends as you can. Exhaust your source: always ask
for one more name, one more number. If your client or another
source promises to provide you with a phone number or address, ask
him or her to do so by phoning you the next day. Stress to your
client the importance, from now on, of always immediately phoning
you with any new information, e.g., a new address, a new work or
home number, a disconnected number, a new friend's address and
phone numbers, etc. Each year applicants are denied asylum or
ordered deported in absentia because attorneys can't reach them.
Always maintain a rich supply of phone numbers and addresses so
that this never happens to you and to your client.
After beginning representation, preclude any possible later
rude surprises by filing a Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act
Request (FOIA) on Form G-639, with a G-28 attached. File the form
as soon as possible to receive any helpful or damaging material to
which you are entitled. You may sign the letter, indicating that all
correspondence should be sent to you. On the envelope's cover,
addressed to the INS District Director in the district in which your
client will have his or her asylum interview, write "FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION ACT REQUEST." If hand-delivered, get your
copy stamped; if mailed, send it certified mail, return receipt
requested.
Is filing a FOIA request necessary? It is unclear whether INS
officers took sworn statements in Guantdnamo, but they did take
interview notes, which the Asylum Officer occasionally has used to
impeach your client's testimony at the asylum interview. INS in
GuantAnamo reportedly "lost" many files, but filing a FOIA request
cannot hurt and may help. Better safe than sorry -- thus filing is
strongly advised.
The returned receipt supports your objection if anything is
introduced which you did not receive but were entitled to. INS must
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respond to the FOIA request within ten days; if it does not, the delay
is considered a denial, which you may appeal. Even if the officer
denies asylum, you should pursue the FOIA request; -INS has an
enormous backlog in FOIA requests but eventually should release the
information, which may prove helpful in subsequent exclusion
proceedings.
VI. Conclusion
Changes in INS adjudicatory policy may improve your client's
chances of winning, but INS has discriminated against Haitians for
years, and any expectation of easy victory is misguided. Winning
takes quality work, which takes time and knowledge. Use and learn
from existing resources. Do not hesitate to phone and ask for
suggestions and information from persons who are there to help.
Obtain, study, use, and as necessary augment and update any
available master exhibit.
You need sensitivity and skill. There are many pitfalls. The
Haitians from Guantnamo are in culture shock, unemployed,
separated from family, and ignorant of the process. They are
understandably distrustful of you and of your Haitian interpreter.
Never use an arrogant or impatient interpreter, which is a recipe for
disaster, or one incapable of interpreting exactly and
phrase-by-phrase. Phrase-by-phrase interpretation is essential; you
neglect this to your client's irremediable detriment. Many of the
Haitians have great claims, but you will not uncover them or will get
them wrong if you ignore trust and interpreter issues, and your client
may lose because of "credibility" problems which you could have
avoided. You need detail, specificity, and plausibility to win, and
you must question your client accordingly. You must know recent
Haitian political history and what questions to ask before you ever
meet your client. You must carefully establish trust before you
begin, but you must be a thorough investigator and cross-examiner
as well, probing, understanding, getting details, triple-checking, and
approximating. Your only goal is to win asylum for this human
being. This dictates all of the techniques, questions, work, and time
you must spend, and the need for quality control.
These prescriptions are practical, not ideal. Winning is
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practical, losing and deportation possibly deadly. You may encounter
pressures, perhaps at an agency handling many claims or as a private
attorney, to produce, to go quicker, perhaps because there are other
Haitians to help. But rushing helps no Haitian. Take pains and as
long as necessary. Err on the side of taking more time, not less.
Help one Haitian win, not many lose. Give your all to your client,
and resist absolutely all pressures to rush. You are fighting for your
client's life. There are no short cuts. The reward for such work
may be the unique feeling you will experience when your client wins
political asylum.
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Appendir A: Haitian History Dateline
Dec. 6, 1492
1520
Oct. 30, 1697
Aug. 14, 1791
1798-1802
Jan. 1, 1804
1807
1820
1822-44
1825
Columbus lands, names "Hispaniola" - within fifty
years, native population of nearly 1,000,000 Taino
Arawak exterminated, gold reserves exhausted.
Beginning of importation of African slaves to
replace rapidly dying out Arawak.
French acquire in Treaty of Ryswick, rename "St.
Domingue," Spanish retain Santo Domingo in west.
Anti-colonial slave revolt begins with Bois de
Caiman ceremony led by Boukman, slave leader and
Voudou priest.
Toussaint Louverture defeats French settlers,
Spanish colonists, British expeditionary force and
mulatto coup to become Governor-General.
Napoleon sends 22,000 troops to regain control.
Toussaint captured, dies in exile.
Revolt under General Jean-Jacques Dessalines
defeats Napoleon's army. The world's first
independent black republic is established, and the
indigenous name "Haiti" is restored.
Haiti is divided into northern kingdom under Henri
Cristophe and southern republic under Alexandre
Pdtion.
Haiti is reunited under Jean-Paul Boyer.
Haiti occupies Spanish Santo Domingo.
France recognizes Haiti in exchange for a 150
million Franc indemnity.
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1862
1914
July 28, 1915
Oct. 27, 1919
Dec. 1934
1946
1950
Sept. 22, 1957
1960s
Apr. 21, 1971
United States recognizes Haiti.
Panama Canal opens, making sea lanes near Haiti of
strategic importance to the United States.
United States invades Haiti.
Rebel ("caco") leader. Charlemagne Pdralte killed by
United States Marines.
United States withdraws, leaving United States-
trained Garde d'Haiti and Section Chief system.
"Special relationship" with United States to persist,
puppet Elie Lescot installed.
Nationalist Dumarqis Estimd's election, supported
by the army, brings modest reforms.
Estimd deposed, with United States support, by
Colonel Paul Magloire.
Francois "Papa Doc" Duvalier takes office in army-
rigged elections, defeating Louis D6joie.
Duvalier establishes Volontaires de la Securit6
Nationale (VSN, a.k.a. Tontons Macoutes),
suppressing virtually all independent organizations
(including Boy Scouts) and dissent. In 1964
Duvalier declares himself "President for Life."
Papa Doc dies. 18-year old Jean-Claude ("Baby
Doc") Duvalier succeeds as President-for-Life the
next day.
Jean-Claude appoints macoute leader
Lafontant the Minister of the Interior.
Nov. 28, 1985 Four students killed in Gonaives, setting off nation-
wide youth rebellion.
1982 Roger
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1986
Feb. 7 Jean-Claude leaves Haiti, preceded by months of
intensive demonstrations, -beginning in Gonaives.
Conseil National de Gouvernement (CNG), under
General Henri Namphy, takes power.
Feb. 25 Namphy formally disbands the Tontons Macoutes,
but many were recruited into the military, few were
disarmed.
Nascence of many popular organizations such as
neighborhood committees, youth groups, etc.
Aristide leads march on Fort Dimanche, soldiers
open fire. Despite the danger, Aristide continues
live broadcast on Radio Soleil, beginning his
reputation as national hero, protected from death.
1987
Mar. 29 A new constitution passes overwhelmingly in a
national referendum. Key features of the
constitution give control of the electoral process to
the independent Provisional Electoral Council and
put a 10-year ban on Duvalierists running for office
(Article 291).
July More than 100 peasant activists massacred at Jean-
Rabel. Aristide addresses crowd in Pont-Sonde
denouncing massacre. Man fires several shots at
stationary Aristide, missing each time, thus
increasing his legend status. That night, Aristide
narrowly eludes another assassination attempt at
Freycineau checkpoint.
Nov. 29 Abortive elections, drowned in blood. Principal
democratic ("Group of Four") reform candidates:
Sylvio Claude (Parti Democrat Chretien d'Haiti or
PDCH), Louis DeJoie, Gerard Gourgues, and Marc
Bazin.
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1988
Jan. 17 Fraudulent "army elections" boycotted, Leslie
Manigat installed.
June 20 Manigat deposed in coup by Namphy after foiled
attempt to arrest drug dealer, Colonel Jean-Claude
Paul. Constitution suspended, military CNG II
established.
Sept. 11 Massacre in St. Jean Bosco, Aristide's church,
orchestrated by Franck Romain, Duvalierist mayor
of Port-au-Prince; 12 killed, 77 wounded.
Attackers appear on television bragging and
threatening to continue to attack Aristide and his
followers.
Sept. 17 Sergeant Joseph Hdbreux and other reformist
officers (the "little soldiers") lead coup against
Namphy and installs Lieutenant General Prosper
Avril.
1989
April Elite "Leopard" unit and Casserne Dessaline unit
attempt coup and are disbanded by Avril.
Dec. 1 Evans Paul and others are beaten, and their bloody
faces televised.
Alvin Adams, the new United States Ambassador,
arrives saying "Bourik chaje pa kanpe" ("A loaded
donkey does not stand still," connoting United
States commitment to elections); is snubbed by
Avril.
1990
Jan. Avril goes to Taiwan for aid; Komite Tt Ansanm
pou One Respb Konstitisyon-an (Committee to
Honor and Respect the Constitution) sends cable
denouncing him. Avril returns empty-handed and
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declares a "State of Siege," imposes censorship, and
rounds up dissidents.
Jan. 29 State of Siege lifted.
Feb. 7 Amnesty for 19 political prisoners, including
November arrestees.
Mar. 5 Eleven-year old girl killed in demonstration in Petit
Goive, galvanizing popular resistance.
Mar. 7 "Group of 12" (later known as Asenble
Konsertasyon, formed in part by senders of January
cable to Taiwan) presses for civilian rule.
Mar. 10 After wave of protests, Avril hands power to Major
General Herard Abraham. Avril departs for Florida
in United States Air Force C-130.
Mar. 12 Nineteen-member Council of State (headed by
Supreme Court Justice Mme. Ertha Pascal-Trouillot)
appointed with mandate to organize elections under
United Nations and Organization of American States
supervision.
June Daylight attack on Council of State kills member of
Council and bodyguard, assassins (two in military
uniform) escape.
July Roger Lafontant, former Minister of the Interior
under Duvalier, and General Williams Regala
openly return from exile; warrants for arrest are
unenforced. "Macoute Spring" declared.
August Five ministers resign in protest of government's
inaction re Lafontant et al. Renewed call for "rach
manyoc."
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Oct. 18 Aristide announces his candidacy under the FNCD
(Fwon Nasyonal pou Chanjman ak Demokrasi)
banner, reversing his earlier position due to the
impunity of the returning Macoute forces. Many
previously "non-political" people join the campaign.
Dec. 5 Bombing at Pdtionville, five Aristide supporters
killed.
Dec. 16 First democratic elections. Aristide wins with 67%
landslide in field of 11 candidates. Many
participated as "mandateurs," i.e., election
monitoring delegates from FNCD et al. at 14,000
polling stations (BIVs) around the country.
1991
Jan. 7 Roger Lafontant kidnaps Trouillot and briefly seizes
power in an abortive coup attempt, foiled by
massive popular resistance.
Feb. 7 Aristide is inaugurated and takes the oath in Kreybl.
He retires most of the army high command. There
is widespread celebration.
March Rural Section Chiefs (Chefs de Section) retired and
ordered to disarm. Town council members and
community organizations choose new civilly-
accountable Communal Police Agents.
Administrative Reform - many corrupt officials of
the former regime are retired or removed.
Community groups play a role in identifying them
for removal. Nearly all are returned to power after
the coup.
July 30 Lafontant et al. sentenced in marathon trial, to life
in prison at hard labor.
Aristide no-confidence vote in Parliament fails.August
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Sept. 25 Aristide addresses United Nations General
Assembly.
Sept. 30 Coup organized by military and elements of the
Cafdteria. Aristide leaves for Venezuela;
widespread massacres, especially in poor
neighborhoods which were hotbeds of Aristide
support. Sylvio Claude killed in Les Cayes,
Lafontant killed in National Penitentiary, Aristide
supporters accused by coup leaders.
Oct. 4 Organization of American States condemns coup,
calls for restoration and embargo of Haiti.
Oct. 8 Soldiers storm Parliament, force acceptance of
Joseph Narette as acting President.
Nov. 1 Major anti-coup protest in Gonaives.
Nov. 8 First post-coup refugees interdicted.
Nov. 12 National Federation of Haitian Students (FENEH)
press conference in Port-au-Prince denounces coup,
80 arrested, including journalists.
Dec. 15 Pirate "Radio VSN-57" for Volunteers for National
Security, the official name for the Tontons
Macoutes) makes infamous "drink their blood"
broadcast, naming more than 100 individuals and
150 organizations. State-run Radio Nationale
rebroadcast these lists in guise of reporting on the
original VSN-57 broadcast as news.
Dec. 25 Luc Desyr, major killer and Macoute leader, and
others released in "Christmas Amnesty." St. Jean
Bosco massacre convicts also released.
1992
Jan. 25 Meeting with Rend Theodore (CP) disrupted by
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February
April 27
April 30
May 18
May 29
June 19
1992-present
army, bodyguard summarily executed.
Wave of repression to avoid commemoration of
inauguration and Jean-Claude's departure.
Sixteen popular organizations call for uprising.
Vatican becomes the only state in the world to
recognize the regime in Haiti.
Haitian Flag Day; a small plane drops Aristide
leaflets in Port-au-Prince, Pdtionville, and Gonaives.
General strike called by 29 popular organizations.
Marc Bazin appointed Prime Minister.
Extreme military repression of popular, peasant,
church, and student organizations, and of any
imagined or imputed pro-Aristide sympathizers,
including extrajudicial executions, arbitrary arrests,
torture, beatings, imprisonment under hellish
conditions, extortion, etc., continues unchecked
throughout Haiti, as extensively and regularly
documented by human rights reports.
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Appendir B: Haitian Words and Concepts
Popular Organizations and Movements
Administrative Reform: process under Aristide whereby officials of
the ancien regime were weeded out and replaced, often with
involvement of grass roots organizations.
Alfabetizasyon: Krey6l adult literacy program; radical in that normal
(i.e., private) schools typically taught only in French, the language
of the elite.
Dechoukaj: literally "uprooting"; the driving out of power or
influence of members or supporters of an ancien regime; occasionally
violent.
Komite Katie: see "neighborhood committee."
Lafanmi Selavi: orphanage organized by Aristide.
Lavalas: "the flood"; name for Aristide's movement, from slogan
"Alone, we are weak; together, we are strong; all together, we are
a flood!"
Literacy Campaigns: see "alfabetizasyon."
Manifestasyon: demonstration.
Neighborhood Committee (komite katie): grass roots civic/political
organizations dedicated to community development and anti-macoute
vigilance; backbone of Lavalas movement, resistance to Lafontant
coup and administrative reforms; acquired semi-official status with
ties to FNCD officials under Aristide.
Patisipan: some clients will use this word for what one would
ordinarily think of as a member, e.g., of a popular organization;
these clients will use "manm" to refer to officers of the organization.
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Rache Manyok: (from slogan rache manyoc, bay te-a blanch or "rip
out the cassava plants, leave the land clean") movement to force
General Namphy's Konsey Nasyonal Gouvenman Proviswa (CNG) to
yield to civilian authority.
Reyounyon: meeting.
Tt Ansanm: "Heads together," a popular name for neighborhood
committees.
Tet Kole: "Heads together"; objected to some former Section Chiefs
slipping back into power as Communal Police Agents.
Ti Kominote Legliz (TKL): see "Ti Legliz."
77 Legliz: the "little church" movement; indigenous form of
Liberation Theology, decentralized, antinomian Christian base
communities; work of God on earth as social justice and welfare of
the poor.
Veye Yo: "watch them"; name of informal anti-macoute vigilance
committees.
The Elections
Alyans Nasyonal pou Demokrasi ak Pwogre (National Alliance for
Democracy and Progress, or ANDP): Marc Bazin's coalition party.
Bulletin: ballot.
Bureau d'Inscription et de Vote (BIV): polling and registration
station; had President, Vice President and Secretary; each of 14,000
BIVs registered a maximum of 250 voters.
Bureau Electoral Communale (BEC): local town electoral office;
participated in voter registration and coordination of polling stations.
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Bureau Electoral Departmental (BED): departmental electoral office,
coordinated the efforts of the BECs.
Deputt: legislator in Chamber of Deputies, as opposed to the senate.
FNCD: Front Nationale pour la Changement et la Democratie/Fwon
Nasyonal pou Chanjman ak Demokrasy (National Front for Change
and Democracy); the coalition-party that nominated Aristide for the
December 16, 1990 elections.
Kok Kalite: game cock, the electoral symbol of Aristide's party, the
FNCD.
Manda: see "mandateur."
Mandateur: authorized campaigner and election observer for a
particular party or candidate; would have been issued a mandate
(manda) and required to show it and register at a polling station.
MIDH: Movement d'Instauration de democratie en Haiti (Movement
for the Establishment of Democracy in Haiti); Party of Marc Bazin.
Parti Democrat chretien d'Haitit (PDCH): Christian Democratic
Party, fielded Sylvio Claude and favored to win in abortive 1987
elections.
Rassemblement des dmocrates nationaux progressistes (RNDP):
party of Leslie Manigat.
Rural Haiti
Adjoint: see Section Chief.
Agent de Police Communale: Communal police agent, accountable to
civilian authority, established by Aristide government in conjunction
with the removal and disarming of the Section Chiefs (chefs de
section) who were accountable to the military.
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Aide de chef. see Section Chief.
Animate: community based development workers.
Carreau (kawo): a unit of land equal to 3.19 acres (plural
"carreaux").
Conseil Administrative de Section Communale (CASEC): Rural
Administrative Council; three member elected councils under civilian
authority envisioned by the 1987 Constitution to take over many civil
functions of the rural Section Chiefs; became active in this role
during Aristide.
Chef de section: see Section Chief.
Communal Police Agent (Agent de Police Communale): office created
by Aristide in conjunction with the retiring and disarming of the
Section Chiefs. Accountable to civilian authority.
Gwoupman: grassroots peasant organizations; some began in mid-
1980s, more after the fall of Baby Doc Duvalier.
Konsey Aksyon Kominote: corrupt community action councils set up
by Francois Duvalier to co-opt peasant movement, back-fired in that
they introduced organizational concepts to the peasantry.
Mawonaj: evasion; low-profile strategy of rapid dissipation adopted
by gwoupman to elude scrutiny by Duvalierist konsey aksyon
kominote and chef seksyon; abandoned in favor of more open action
after the fall of Baby Doc Duvalier.
Peze-souse: "squeeze and suck"; system of surplus extraction from
the peasantry by urban speculators and exporters.
Section Chief (chef de section): rural overlord under military, not
civilian control. Notorious for fraudulent manipulation of land titles
and livestock transactions. A law unto themselves, they frequently
beat, imprisoned, and killed peasants with impunity. Some had cages
or dungeons in their homes. Typically had dozens of aides or
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adjoints as private thug force. Some functions taken over by the
CASECs. Removed and disarmed altogether under Aristide and
replaced by the office of Communal Police Agent. Back in power
with a vengeance after the coup.
Agents of Repression
Anti-gang unit: See Service des Recherches Criminelles.
Army: khaki-yellow uniforms are the regular army; olive green are
combat troops. Police wear light blue shirts and dark blue pants,
macoutes wear dark blue denim.
Caftteria: headquarters of the 4th Company of the Port-au-Prince
police; especially active in the coup.
Chef generic term for authority figure (soldier, macoute, police,
etc.); check the color of the uniform.
Djak: torture position where arms are wrapped around bended knees
and tied in front. A baton is slid under the knees and above the
elbows, forcing the person into a fixed ball-like position for beating.
Sometimes a rope is tied around the neck and to the ankles for
additional restraint.
Macoute: either a member of the Tonton Macoutes/VSN (see "Tonton
Macoute") or a generic reference, roughly "reactionary" or "abusive
asshole."
'Police": often used generically to refer to any armed authority
figure; (actual police wore light blue shirts and dark blue pants and
were rare outside of Port-au-Prince and Cap Haitian.)
Politikay: a derogatory reference to the political class, i.e.,
kleptocrats and abusers of power (understand that "political" may be
interpreted this way).
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San Manmans: "motherless ones"; name chosen by Tontons Macoutes
of St. Marc; involved in ambush of Aristide in August 1987 at
Freycineau and election violence in November 1987.
Service des Resherches Criminelles: "anti-gang" unit responsible for
numerous human rights violations.
Tonton Macoute: literally, "uncle Knapsack" (named after mythical
bogeyman who snatches children); formed by Francois ("Papa Doc")
Duvalier as the Voluntaires pour Securite National (VSN) in 1957;
paramilitary group (wore dark blue denim uniforms and, often,
sunglasses for 'zombie'-like effect).
Zenglendo: brazen, heavily armed bandits widely assumed to be off-
duty soldiers or macoutes integrated into the army, particularly active
under Avril.
General
Laku: extended-family compound with common courtyard center.
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Appendir C: List of People to Contact for Expert Affidavits
Jocelyn McCalla or Anne Fuller at the National Coalition for
Haitian Refugees (NCHR), 16 East 42nd Street, 3rd Floor, New
York, NY 10017, (212) 867-0020; William O'Neill, Deputy Director
of the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, 330 7th Avenue, 10th
Floor, New York, NY 10001, (212) 629-6170; Kenneth Roth,
Deputy Director, Human Rights Watch, 485 Fifth Avenue, 3rd Floor,
New York, NY 10017, (212) 972-8400.
Bernard Diederich, c/o Time Magazine, 2801 Ponce de Leon
Blvd., Suite 460, Coral Gables, FL 33134, consultant for Time
Magazine and for fifteen years its Caribbean bureau chief based in
Mexico City, co-authored with Al Burt PAPA Doc (1968), a seminal
work on Francois Duvalier which was translated into many languages
and released in paperback and which earned him the undying enmity
of the dictator's powerful widow. He has covered many of Haiti's
political crises, spending much time there, and continues to visit and
report from Haiti.
Amy Wilentz, at NCHR, 16 East 42nd Street, 3rd Floor, New
York, NY 10017, (212) 867-0020, author of THE RAINY SEAsoN:
HAm SINCE DUVALIER (1989) and of numerous articles on Haiti, has
previously given expert testimony and can testify on a broad range of
subjects, including the Tonton Macoutes, the Haitian military,
persecution of the Catholic Church's Ti Legliz movement, and recent
human rights violations. She was consultant for Americas Watch on
a human rights delegation to Haiti in December 1991.
Catherine Maternowska, c/o Mendoza, 2855 Tigertail Avenue
#317, Miami, FL 33133, (305) 285-0681, is a medical anthropologist
intimately familiar with Haitian politics and culture who has done
extensive research in Haiti's slums and countryside. She lived in
Haiti from 1984 to September 1991, working primarily on women's
reproductive health and health training issues. Based in Port-au-
Prince's Citd Soleil, an Aristide stronghold, she also spent extensive
periods working in Gonaives, Cap Haitien, Ouanaminthe, and
Mirebalais training health workers and helping establish health and
family programs, worked with adult literacy programs in Citd Soleil,
Mirebalais, and in the countryside, and designed educational materials
for non-literate audiences.
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Paul Farmer, c/o Partners in Health, 113 River Street,
Cambridge, MA 02139, (617) 661-4564, M.D., Ph.D., has
doctorates in medicine and social anthropology and is an instructor in
social medicine at Harvard Medical School and a research resident in
internal medicine at a leading Boston hospital. For ten years he has
worked with peasants in Haiti's Central Plateau and is intimately
familiar with all aspects of Haitian politics, society, and culture. He
has testified as an expert in asylum cases and is the author of AIDS
AND ACCUSATION: HAITI AND THE GEOGRAPHY OF BLAME (1992).
Anne-Christine d'Adesky, at NCHR, 16 East 42nd Street, 3rd
Floor, New York, NY 10017, (212) 867-0020, a free-lance
investigative reporter with an extensive Haitian background, since
1985 has frequently been to Haiti as a journalist and written on
Aristide and human rights conditions for the Village Voice, the L.A.
Weekly, the San Francisco Examiner, and other news organizations.
Mark Danner, The New Yorker, 20 West 43rd St., New York,
NY 10036, a staff writer at The New Yorker, wrote extensive
"Reporter at Large" articles on Haitian political and social conditions
in the magazine's November 27, December 4, and December 11,
1989 issues, other pieces on Haiti in the New York Times Magazine
and elsewhere, and has visited Haiti many times. Karen McCarthy
Brown, Drew University SEM, Madison, NJ 07940, (201) 408-3277,
is a professor of graduate sociology and anthropology of religion who
from 1973 to 1990 worked in Haiti two or three times per year and
has extensive experience and knowledge of Haitian voodoo and of
political, social, women, and youth issues. Theresa Patterson, 208
Leake Avenue, Nashville, TN 37205, is co-director of the Catholic
Church's Adopt-A-Parish Program, which links parishes here with
parishes or other projects in Haiti like orphanages, nutrition centers,
and hospitals. Over the last fourteen years Ms. Patterson, who has
contacts in all parts of Haiti, has been there twenty-five times, each
time for three to four weeks. Alex Stepick, Department of Sociology
and Anthropology, FlU, Miami, FL 33199, Professor of
Anthropology and Sociology and Director of Comparative Sociology,
Graduate Program, at Florida International University, was
extensively involved in Haitian asylum cases in the early 1980s.
Professor Stepick was last in Haiti in the mid-1980s and more
recently has focused on the adaptation of Haitians to life in South
Florida.
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Kathie Kiarreich, Global Exchange, 2017 Mission Street,
Suite 303, San Francisco, CA 94110, (415) 255-7296, worked in and
out of Haiti since 1986 and lived there from September 1988 to
August 1991 as Haiti Program Coordinator for Global Exchange, a
non-profit organization involved in education and development in
third world countries, and as a free-lance journalist. Renald
Clerisme, 420 Temple Street, Room 305, New Haven, CT 06511,
(203) 436-2063, a former priest who voluntarily left the priesthood,
is getting a doctorate in anthropology at Yale but lived in Haiti until
August 1991, when he came to the United States to study. Active in
movements to help peasants, he was one of the seven coordinating
members of Tet Kole ("Heads Together"), formed in 1986, which
had branches throughout rural Haiti. Elsie Etheart, 9337 N.W. 2nd
Court, Miami, FL 33150, journalist and co-editor of the
internationally published weekly journal, Haiti En Marche, and
co-host of three Creole language radio programs in Miami, was
forcibly exiled in 1980 from Haiti, where she was a radio journalist
with Radio Metropole. Marc (Marcus) Garcia, 173 N.W. 94th
Street, Miami, FL 33150, journalist and co-editor of Haiti En
Marche, and co-host of several Creole language radio programs, was
forcibly exiled in 1980 from Haiti, where he was a radio journalist
with Radio Haiti-Inter and Radio Metropole. Jonathan Demme,
Clinica Estetico, 652 Broadway, Suite 8-F, New York, NY 10012,
is a film director and producer with a commitment to justice in Haiti.
Karen Richmond, post-doctoral fellow, New World Studies,
University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA 22903, (804) 924-7044,
is an anthropologist who did research in Port-au-Prince in 1977 and
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